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“A Legacy of Discrimination”?  The
Rhetoric and Reality of the Faith-
Based Initiative: Oregon as a
Case Study
Charitable Choice, otherwise known as the Faith-Based Initi-ative, represents one of the more controversial policy initia-
tives to come out of Washington, D.C., in recent memory.
Enacted in 1996 as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA or the “Welfare
Reform Act”), Charitable Choice was an important component
of the movement to restructure, reduce, and privatize “welfare as
we kn[e]w it.”1  Charitable Choice authorizes faith-based organi-
zations (FBOs) to participate in government-funded social ser-
vices programs by requiring federal and state agencies that
contract with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to allow
FBOs to compete for grants and contracts “on the same basis as
any other nongovernmental provider without impairing the relig-
ious character of such organizations.”2
Charitable Choice does more than guarantee similar access to
government programs, however.  The legislation contains provi-
sions that favor or protect, depending on one’s perspective, relig-
iously affiliated entities.  A participating FBO is guaranteed its
independence from all governmental entities, “including such or-
ganization’s control over the definition, development, practice,
and expression of its religious beliefs.”3  Moreover, FBOs are not
required to alter their form of governance to participate in any
* Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Government, Willamette
University College of Law.
1 PRWORA’s Charitable Choice provisions are codified in 42 U.S.C. § 604a
(2000).
2 Id.  § 604a(b).
3 Id.  § 604a(d)(1).
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contract or grant, or to remove religious art, icons, or other sym-
bols in their buildings where the publicly funded services take
place.4  Finally, participation in a government-funded grant or
contract does not affect the ability of FBOs to discriminate on
the basis of religion in their employment practices, as provided
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in section 702.5
Equally as controversial as the religious discrimination provi-
sion is the underlying notion of the government employing relig-
ious entities to provide important public services.  At the risk of
understatement, government funding of religious organizations
has traditionally raised Establishment Clause concerns.6  While
this is true in a general sense, the Supreme Court has long al-
lowed discrete forms of aid to flow to religious institutions to ac-
complish secular ends.7  Thus, more than one hundred years ago
the Court upheld a federal construction grant for a new building
at a religiously affiliated hospital in the District of Columbia.8
Provided the aid funds secular programs or activities of religious
organizations—such as Medicare funds paid for health care re-
ceived at a religious hospital—and sufficient safeguards are in
place to ensure that public funds are not expended on religious
activities,9 the Establishment Clause permits religious organiza-
tions to participate in many government benefit programs.10
Where Charitable Choice becomes controversial is that it blurs
4 Id.  §§ 604a(d)(2)(A)-(B).
5 Id.  § 604a(f).  Section 702 is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.  For a discussion
of the discrimination issue, compare Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination,
Public Funding, and Constitutional Values , 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2002), with
CARL H. ESBECK ET AL., THE FREEDOM OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS TO
STAFF ON A RELIGIOUS BASIS (2004).
6 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (“No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions . . . .”); see
also id.  at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (describing that the Establishment Clause
“prohibition broadly forbids state support, financial or other[wise], of religion in any
guise, form or degree.  It outlaws all use of public funds for religious purposes.”).
7 See Everson , 330 U.S. at 17-18 (upholding reimbursement for transportation ex-
penses associated with religious schooling); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)
(allowing state funding for textbooks, mandated testing, and diagnostic and thera-
peutic services at parochial schools).
8 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
9 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1997) (documenting how govern-
ment funds are not expended on religious activities). Accord Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“Our cases have permitted some government funding of secular functions per-
formed by sectarian organizations . . . . These decisions, however, provide no prece-
dent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities.”).
10 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988).
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the line between funding identifiably secular activities (usually
permitted) and faith-infused activities (traditionally not permit-
ted) of religious organizations.11  To be sure, Charitable Choice
law prohibits any federal funds being spent directly on religious
worship, instruction, or proselytization.12  However, most critics
of Charitable Choice view this hard-fought safeguard as ineffec-
tual considering the lack of oversight provisions in the law and
the likelihood that program beneficiaries may be disinclined to
object to religious elements in their services.13  Also, Charitable
Choice discards the traditional presumption against funding
“pervasively sectarian” organizations: those institutions “in
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of [their]
functions are subsumed in the[ir] religious mission.”14  As a re-
sult of this last provision, churches, temples, and mosques—not
merely religiously affiliated agencies like Catholic Charities USA
and Lutheran Social Services—that have no experience in segre-
gating religious from nonreligious activities and are primarily
committed to the spiritual transformation of peoples’ lives,15 may
receive public funds for their religiously integrated services.16
The term “religiously integrated” is used purposefully, as ex-
tending eligibility to pervasively religious entities is the primary
explanation for the enactment of Charitable Choice.  As noted
above, prior Supreme Court decisions had indicated that the gov-
ernment could partner with religious organizations to further
their mutual goals of assisting the poor and dispossessed.17  For
11 See supra  note 9.
12 Charitable Choice prohibits FBOs from using any direct funding (e.g., con-
tracts, grants) on “sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization,” but this restric-
tion does not apply to funds obtained through a voucher or certificate.  42 U.S.C.
§ 604a(j) (2000).
13 As originally enacted, Charitable Choice did not notify beneficiaries of their
rights to receive services through a nonreligious alternative if they objected to re-
ceiving services through a religious provider.  Certainly, it may be argued that “sec-
tarian worship, instruction or proselytizing” does not constitute the sum total of
potential religious activities. See  Steven K. Green, Charitable Choice and Neutrality
Theory , 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 33, 45-46 (2000); Alan Brownstein, Constitu-
tional Questions About Charitable Choice , in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS 219-65 (Derek Davis & Barry Hankins eds., 1999).
14 Bowen , 487 U.S. at 610 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
15 Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty,
Equality, and Free Speech Values – A Critical Analysis of “Neutrality Theory” and
Charitable Choice , 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243 (1999).
16 Consistent with the bulk of the literature, this Article uses the term “FBO” to
encompass both religiously integrated and religiously affiliated entities.
17 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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example, in 1988 the Court held that religious organizations
could constitutionally participate in a federally funded program
directed at providing abstinence counseling and family planning
to teenage girls, notwithstanding the fact that the counseling ser-
vices provided by the religious organizations conformed with
their religious teachings about premarital sexual relations, con-
traceptive use, and abortion.18  Bowen v. Kendrick  and similar
decisions merely recognized the longstanding practice whereby
local and state agencies had relied on, and frequently contributed
financial support to, the social ministries of religious organiza-
tions.19  But the corresponding rule from Bowen  was that public
funds could not pay for inherently religious activities or for a
program in which religion is so intertwined that the functions are
inseparable: “[W]e have always been careful to ensure that direct
government aid to religious affiliated institutions does not have
the primary effect of advancing religion.  One way in which di-
rect government aid might have that effect is if the aid flows to
institutions that are ‘pervasively sectarian.’”20
The Court made clear, however, that in the absence of such
factors, it had “never held that religious institutions [were] dis-
abled by the First Amendment from participating in publicly
sponsored social welfare programs.”21
If this was the state of the law in 1996 when Charitable Choice
was enacted (as it was), such that religious organizations could
already participate in government grants and contracts,22 then
18 Bowen , 487 U.S. at 609.
19 See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX: RELIGIOUS
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 63-108 (1996); STEVE RATHGEB
SMITH AND MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE
AGE OF CONTRACTING 8-9, 48-49 (1993).
20 Bowen , 487 U.S. at 609-10.
[W]e have said that the Establishment Clause does ‘prohibit government-
financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a par-
ticular religious faith,’ and we have accordingly struck down programs that
entail an unacceptable risk that government funding would be used to ‘ad-
vance the religious mission’ of the religious institution receiving aid.
Id.  at 611-12 (citation omitted).
21 Id.  at 609.  The Bowen  Court remanded the case to the district court to deter-
mine whether any of the recipient organizations were pervasively sectarian or had
used public funds for specifically religious activities. Id . at 621.  The parties eventu-
ally settled the case after the district court denied the government’s motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that genuine issues existed whether some grantees
were pervasively sectarian and public funds were paying for religious activities. See
Kendrick v. Bowen, 766 F. Supp. 1180 (D.D.C. 1991).
22 And quite clearly they did.  In 1996, the year Charitable Choice was enacted,
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questions arise as to whether the purpose of Charitable Choice
was to institute a fundamental change in the rules governing pub-
lic funding of religiously integrated entities and activities.  The
logical conclusion is that Charitable Choice sought to extend the
existing law to authorize not merely the funding of secular faith-
motivated  programs, but the funding of faith-integrated  pro-
grams, provided that public funds do not pay for actual worship,
proselytization, or religious instruction, assuming a distinction
exists.  Public statements by President George W. Bush support
this view: “Faith-based programs are only effective because they
do practice faith.  It’s important for our government to under-
stand that.”23  If this is the explanation, then Charitable Choice
represents a frontal assault on a core Establishment Clause prin-
ciple: the prohibition on funding inherently religious activity.24
However, another possible justification exists for Charitable
Choice.  Charitable Choice proponents argued that a vast gulf
existed between constitutional interpretations and actual prac-
tice—that misunderstanding of the law, outdated and burden-
some regulations, and ingrained prejudice against religious
organizations led to subtle if not overt government discrimina-
tion against religious organizations, particularly against smaller
interchurch or congregationally based programs.  Others argued
that the old rules requiring essentially secular approaches had
discriminated against pervasively religious organizations and
evinced a climate of hostility towards using religious solutions to
address human problems.25  Enabling and funding congregations
to provide social services would make welfare more efficient (by
restricting government bureaucracies), less expensive, more per-
sonable, and produce more effective results through the trans-
forming power of faith-based approaches.26
the member agencies of Catholic Charities USA received approximately $1.3 billion
in grants and contracts from federal, state, and local sources for their programs. See
infra  notes 137-42 and accompanying text; see also MONSMA, supra  note 19, at 63-
108.
23 Press Release, The White House, President Speaks with Faith-Based and Com-
munity Leaders (Jan. 15, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2004/01/
20040115-7.html.
24 See  Green, supra  note 13, at 45.
25 See, e.g. , Carl H. Esbeck, The Neutral Treatment of Religion and Faith-Based
Social Service Providers: Charitable Choice and Its Critics , in WELFARE REFORM,
supra  note 13, at 173, 180-82.
26 See generally CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT
AND FAITH-BASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENCIES (2000); JOE LOCONTE, SEDUC-
ING THE SAMARITAN: HOW GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS ARE RESHAPING SOCIAL
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This perspective was best represented by a 2001 White House
report entitled Unlevel Playing Field , which was prepared shortly
into President George W. Bush’s first administration and pur-
ported to document the myriad ways that FBOs had unfairly
been excluded from participating in government-funded social
service programs.27  Prepared by the new White House Office of
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI), the report ex-
amined the percentage of federal grants received by religious
nonprofits and concluded that “[t]here exists a widespread bias
against faith- and community-based organizations in Federal so-
cial service programs.”28  The conventional wisdom aired during
the debates surrounding Charitable Choice legislation and the
underlying premise that has fueled President Bush’s Faith-Based
Initiative is that overzealous interpretations of constitutional
mandates, ingrained prejudice against religion, and bureaucratic
red tape have stood in the way of FBOs being full players in the
human service network.29  With the discrimination finally lifted,
smaller FBOs and congregations (the “armies of compassion”)
would rush to address the unmet societal need.
This Article examines the rhetoric and assumptions behind this
latter claim and compares it to the reality of one test case: Ore-
gon, the most unchurched of the fifty states.30  If any state experi-
ence should substantiate the premises underlying Charitable
Choice it should be Oregon, known for its independent spirit,
liberal environmental policies, and permissive social attitude to-
ward obscenity and end-of-life decisions.  In few states is organ-
ized religion more suspect.  Moreover, in the early part of the
twenty-first century, Oregon had the highest unemployment rate
in the nation as well as some of the highest poverty and hunger
rates.31  At the same time, the state budget experienced a major
SERVICES (1997); MONSMA, supra  note 19; Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case
for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers , 46 EMORY
L.J. 1 (1997).
27 THE WHITE HOUSE, UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD: BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION
BY FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN FEDERAL SOCIAL SERVICE
PROGRAMS (2001), available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/
unlevelfield.html.
28 Id.  at 2.
29 Id.  at 11, 13-14.
30 Shelly Oppel, The Separation Between Church and Oregon, THE OREGONIAN
(Portland, Or.), Sept. 18, 2002, at A1 (noting that thirty-one percent of Oregonians
attend places of worship, the lowest figure in the nation).
31 See Gail Kinsey Hill, Oregon Tallies Most Jobs Ever , THE OREGONIAN (Port-
land, Or.), Mar. 1, 2005, at A1 (documenting Oregon’s 2001-2004 recession).
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revenue shortfall, resulting in the slashing of public funding for
social programs and public education.32  In essence, between
2001 and 2004, Oregon was a state in need.  The State’s resis-
tance to contracting and partnering with FBOs to address the
suffering of the state’s citizenry would support allegations of gov-
ernment discrimination against religious entities and solutions.
Part One of this Article provides an overview of Charitable
Choice, examining the arguments for its enactment and subse-
quent expansion of the Faith-Based Initiative under the Bush
Administration.  Part Two then considers the history of state con-
tracting with FBOs in Oregon as well as its recent practice to see
how it conforms to independent studies and the rhetoric support-
ing Charitable Choice.  Much of the data and information dis-
cussed in this Part is based on a 2002-2004 study commissioned
by the Oregon Law Commission to examine the Faith-Based Ini-
tiative in Oregon.33  This study concludes that, contrary to the
politically charged rhetoric at the national level, the State of Ore-
gon has long maintained a successful relationship with FBOs, a
relationship that predated Charitable Choice.  Even though state
contracting and partnering has traditionally been with estab-
lished religiously affiliated agencies such as Catholic Social Ser-
vices and Lutheran Family Services, the State has willingly
partnered with pervasively religious organizations and smaller
congregational entities on occasion.  The study concludes that the
failure of the State to contract more frequently with these latter
entities is primarily attributable to generic factors such as pro-
gram complexity and the lack of infrastructure and sophistication
among potential religious providers, rather than due to overt or
subtle discrimination.  Part Two concludes with an analysis of Or-
egon law to see whether it may serve to inhibit or discriminate
against religious organizations.
Finally, Part Three makes an argument for cautious collabora-
tion between government and FBOs.  This Part seeks to get be-
yond the rhetoric to examine more compelling arguments for
32 See  James Mayer, Two Money Measures Approved , THE OREGONIAN (Port-
land, Or.), Sept. 18, 2002, at A1.
33 See OREGON LAW COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE OREGON LAW COMMISSION
NON-PROFIT SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY STUDY GROUP (2003) [hereinafter RE-
PORT].  The Author served as the reporter for the study.  The Oregon Law Commis-
sion gave the Author permission to incorporate portions of the Report in this
Article.  The views expressed in this Article do not represent those of the Oregon
Law Commission, Willamette University, or any other entity.
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government partnering with religious entities.  It argues that re-
ligious organizations should be able to participate in many gov-
ernment-funded social service programs and that to exclude their
participation is often unnecessary (in a constitutional sense) and
undesirable as a policy matter.  Generally speaking, congrega-
tions and religious organizations contribute to the social good
and are a positive influence in our democratic society.  Because
of their commitment to compassion and alleviating human suffer-
ing, religious organizations may be particularly adept at provid-
ing important social services.  Church-state separationists, who
are predominately politically and socially liberal, should embrace
religious involvement in social service programs, though they
should not yield on their demands for constitutional safeguards
under Charitable Choice.  As a result, while this Article argues
that Charitable Choice may have made a positive contribution in
the debate over how to best provide services to people in need, it
has been advanced for many wrong reasons, the least of which
being partisan political gain.  By aggressively pushing the dis-
crimination argument, the Bush Administration has unnecessa-
rily politicized the issue while alienating many who might
otherwise embrace partnering between FBOs and the govern-
ment.  At the same time, the Bush Administration has depreci-
ated the constitutional concerns present in the public funding of
religiously infused programs.
I
THE ORIGINS OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
FAITH-BASED INITIATIVE
Charitable Choice emerged in 1995 as part of Congress’ re-
sponse to President Bill Clinton’s call for welfare reform.
Spearheaded by then-Republican Senator John Ashcroft of Mis-
souri, the Senate attached Charitable Choice to the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), which replaced the oft-maligned Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Emergency Assistance
(EA) programs with a program of capped state entitlements
called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).34  On
its own, the Welfare Reform Act—with its primary goals of
34 See  141 CONG. REC. S11640 (1995); Julie A. Segal, A “Holy Mistaken Zeal”:
The Legislative History and Future of Charitable Choice , in WELFARE REFORM,
supra  note 13, at 9-27.
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privatization, devolution of authority, and reduction in welfare
roles—was highly controversial, rejecting the presumption of
guaranteed benefits or “entitlements” for those in need.  In its
place, PRWORA limited eligibility to two years of assistance
while “encouraging” states to reduce welfare roles.35  Charitable
Choice only added to the controversy by ensuring that religious
organizations could compete for grants and contracts on an equal
basis with nonreligious NGOs while providing protection for a
participating FBO’s religious character, internal structure, and
staffing.36  And, as discussed above, Charitable Choice dispensed
with the distinction between religiously affiliated and pervasively
sectarian organizations; under the law, all religious organizations
were presumptively eligible to participate in government grant
programs.  Despite the addition of this controversial element to
the Welfare Reform Act, Charitable Choice comported with
President Clinton’s overall desire to reform welfare and reach
out to the nonprofit and religious sectors.37  The Senate passed
Ashcroft’s Charitable Choice provision by a sixty-seven to thirty-
two vote, and President Clinton signed the bill into law in August
1996.38
Following its enactment in the Welfare Reform Act, Congress
added Charitable Choice provisions to other federally funded so-
cial service programs.  Charitable Choice requirements now ap-
ply statutorily to four federal programs that are distributed as
formula grants to the states: the TANF program; the Welfare to
Work program (WtW); the Community Services Block Grant
program (CSBG); and the Substance Abuse Prevention and
Treatment (SAPT) Block Grant and Projects for Assistance in
Transition from Homelessness (PATH) programs administered
by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration
(SAMHSA).39  The U.S. Department of Labor has also applied
Charitable Choice requirements to the Workforce Investment
Act (WIA), which is distributed through state Workforce Invest-
35 See  Lewis D. Solomon & Matthew J. Vissides, Jr., Faith-Based Charities and the
Quest to Solve America’s Social Ills: A Legal and Policy Analysis , 10 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 265, 271-73 (Spring 2001).
36 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b), (c), (d)(2), (f) (2000).
37 See  Segal, supra  note 34, at 22-23 (describing the Clinton Administration’s
mixed signals of support for Charitable Choice).
38 142 CONG. REC. S8501, S8508 (1996); Segal, supra  note 34, at 22-23.
39 See IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH
FAITH-BASED SERVICE PROVIDERS: THE STATE OF THE LAW 51-70 (2002).
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ment Boards to One-Stop employment centers.40  In addition,
Charitable Choice-like provisions exist in two federal programs
administered by states that predate the Welfare Reform Act: the
1990 Child Care and Development Block Grant program (now
administered through PRWORA) and the 1981 Adolescent Fam-
ily Life Act/Abstinence Education Grant Program.41
Despite supporting all of these subsequent laws, the Clinton
Administration was never a strong advocate for Charitable
Choice.  Some within the White House insisted that constitu-
tional prohibitions on funding of pervasively sectarian organiza-
tions constrained the eligibility of some potential participants.42
Possibly due in part to the Administration’s lukewarm support
for the measure, for the first several years Charitable Choice re-
ceived little public attention outside of social service circles.43
That situation changed dramatically with the election of
George W. Bush as President.  As Governor of Texas, Bush had
embraced the ideas of Marvin Olasky, a religiously conservative
University of Texas journalism professor who coined the phrase
“compassionate conservatism” while advocating for the religious
privatization of many government programs.44  Governor Bush
had also established an advisory task force to study the imple-
mentation of Charitable Choice in his state.45  Thus, it was during
the 2000 presidential election that most Americans first became
aware of Charitable Choice or the Faith-Based Initiative, as it
came to be known.  Candidate Bush made Charitable Choice a
centerpiece of his “compassionate conservatism” campaign.  He
pledged to enlist “armies of compassion” to address America’s
social service crisis, a force that would rely primarily on religious
and civic organizations: “[W]hen we see social needs in America,
my administration will look first to faith-based programs and
community groups, which have proven their power to save and
change lives.”46
40 Id.  at 56, 66.
41 Id.  at 57-63.
42 Telephone Interview with William Marshall, White House Deputy Counsel
(Aug. 1, 2000).
43 See  Elbert Lin et al., Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political Future of
Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives , 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 183, 188 (2002).
44 See MARVIN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992).
45 See GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON FAITH-BASED COMMUNITY SER-
VICE GROUPS, FAITH IN ACTION . . . A NEW VISION FOR CHURCH-STATE COOPERA-
TION IN TEXAS (1996).
46 Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President in Announcement
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In one of his first acts upon taking office on January 31, 2001,
President Bush established the White House Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI) to oversee and direct
his push for a national faith-based initiative.47  On the same day,
he issued an executive order establishing centers for faith-based
and community initiatives within five executive departments:
Health and Human Services; Labor; Housing and Urban Devel-
opment; Education; and Justice, headed by the new Attorney
General John Ashcroft.48  The purpose of these various offices
was to identify and “eliminate regulatory . . . [and] programmatic
obstacles to the full participation of faith-based and community
organizations in the provision of social services” and to “create a
hospitable environment for groups that have not traditionally
collaborated with [the] government.”49  The first order of busi-
ness for the OFBCI and departmental offices was to undertake
an audit “to identify all existing barriers to the participation of
faith-based and other community organizations in the delivery of
social services” and to issue a report on the findings.50  Seven
months later, the OFBCI issued its report Unlevel Playing Field ,
“confirming” the suspicions of the President about the existence
of significant and unjustified barriers to full participation by
FBOs and NGOs in federal social service programs.51
Unlevel Playing Field is more of a manifesto than an empirical
report.  With the assumptions already laid out in the White
House blueprint Rallying the Armies of Compassion  that accom-
panied the release of the January 31, 2001 executive orders, the
“findings” of the report are hardly surprising.  The report de-
clared, “[t]here exists a widespread bias against faith- and com-
munity-based organizations in Federal social service programs”
as demonstrated through various federal rules, policies, and prac-
tices such as:  (1) restricting some religious organizations from
of the Faith-Based Initiative (Jan. 29, 2001),  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ re-
leases/20010129-5.html; Michelle Dibadj, The Legal and Social Consequences of
Faith-Based Initiatives and Charitable Choice ,  26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 529, 529 (2002).
47 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
48 Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 29, 2001).
49 See PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, RALLYING THE ARMIES OF COMPASSION
(2001), available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/reports/ faithbased.pdf.
50 Exec. Order No. 13,198, supra  note 48.
51 That the report would confirm such suspicions was never in doubt as the Execu-
tive Order provided that the report “shall include . . . a comprehensive analysis of
the barriers to the full participation of faith-based and other community organiza-
tions in the delivery of social services.” Id.
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applying for funding; (2) restricting religious activities that are
not prohibited by the Constitution; (3) not honoring rights that
religious organizations have under federal law; and (4) burdening
small organizations with cumbersome regulations and
requirements.52
The report made clear, however, that these barriers are not
inadvertent or otherwise legally justified;53 rather, these rules,
policies, and practices represent a pervasive “anti-religious bias”
and “systemic discrimination” toward religion.54  Much of the ev-
idence of discrimination relied on anecdotal incidents and data
indicating that religious organizations receive minimal award
amounts under formula and discretionary grant programs.55  The
report’s use of provocative language (e.g., equating government
regulation of religious organizations to “an organizational strip
search”) set a clear tone: the government, or at least its social
service agencies, was hostile toward religious providers and pre-
pared to “marginalize or eliminate” the religious character and
autonomy of any religious organization that had the temerity to
participate in a social service program.56
The “findings” in Unlevel Playing Field relied in part on stud-
ies and articles written by religiously conservative social scientists
and legal scholars.  One such study was a report by the Center
for Public Justice, a leading supporter of Charitable Choice, is-
sued immediately before the election on September 28, 2000.57
This report provided a self-styled “report-card” on state compli-
ance with Charitable Choice, finding that most states had
amassed a “failing grade” (Texas, under the leadership of then-
Governor Bush, received an “A+”).58 Unlevel Playing Field and
52 THE WHITE HOUSE, UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD, supra  note 27.
53 See id.  at 11 (attacking the “‘no-aid’ strict separationist framework that permit-
ted Federal funding only of religiously affiliated organizations offering secular ser-
vices in a secularized setting, [while denying] equal treatment to organizations with
an obvious religious character.”).  Of note, the report distinguishes between relig-
iously affiliated organizations and religiously infused entities where it supports the
discrimination argument, while combining the two entities in other places where it
discusses the range of potential services offered by FBOs. Id.  at 11-13.
54 Id . at 4, 11, 17, 18.
55 See id . at 4-7 (indicating that in fiscal years 2000 and 2001, FBOs received only
2% and 0.3% of discretionary grant funds from the Departments of Education and
Justice, respectively).
56 Id.  at 13.
57 See CTR. FOR PUB. JUST., CHARITABLE CHOICE COMPLIANCE: A NATIONAL
REPORT CARD (2000), http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyreader$296.
58 Id.
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the Center for Public Justice report also relied on a 2000 prelimi-
nary study by Amy L. Sherman, Senior Fellow at the Hudson
Institute, which indicated that in the three-and-a-half years since
the enactment of PRWORA, only 3.5% of FBOs contracting
with the government were congregations.59  Such studies com-
monly equated the disparity in funding of FBOs with govern-
ment discrimination against religion.60  Works of other
conservative scholars, such as social scientists Stephen V. Mon-
sma of Pepperdine University and Charles L. Glenn of Boston
University, documented the corrupting and secularizing effect of
government regulations on FBOs participating in social service
programs.61  Finally, Missouri law professor Carl Esbeck, one of
the architects of Charitable Choice, transformed such data into a
concise legal argument of religious discrimination.  Professor Es-
beck, later a Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General,
has long been one of the more effective advocates for Charitable
Choice, arguing as early as 1992 for altering the legal standard to
allow government funding of religiously integrated social service
programs.62  According to Esbeck, “the exclusion of certain relig-
ious providers based on what they believe and because of how
they practice and express what they believe, is discrimination on
the bases of religious exercise and religious speech.”63
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits intentional discrimination
against religion, as well as against religious belief and practice.
Yet the “pervasively sectarian” test necessarily causes state wel-
fare bureaucracies to discriminate against the religious beliefs
and practices of “pervasively sectarian” providers.  Moreover,
such discrimination puts tremendous pressure on these providers
to compromise their spirituality so as not to lose program oppor-
tunities.  “The current system makes government grant programs
59 See  Amy L. Sherman, The Growing Impact of Charitable Choice: A Catalogue
of New Collaborations Between Government and Faith-Based Organizations in Nine
States  (2000), http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyreader$315.
60 See  John C. Green & Amy L. Sherman, Fruitful Collaborations: A Survey of
Government-Funded Faith-Based Programs in 15 States, Executive Summary  1
(2002), http://www.hudsonfaithincommunities.org/fic/articles/fruitful_collab_exec.
pdf.
61 See GLENN, supra  note 26; MONSMA, supra  note 19, at 70-108.  For a critique of
Glenn’s book, see Steven K. Green, The Ambiguity of Neutrality , 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 692 (2001).
62 See  Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation of Religiously Based Social Ser-
vices: The First Amendment Considerations , 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343 (1992);
see also  Esbeck, supra  note 25.
63 Esbeck, supra  note 25, at 177.
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relentless engines of secularization.”64
Thus, Unlevel Playing Field and its supportive studies and arti-
cles provided the Bush administration with a basis on which to
argue for the expansion of the Faith-Based Initiative to amelio-
rate government discrimination against religion.65  According to
the Roundtable on Religion and Social Policy of the State Uni-
versity of New York, Bush “gave seven speeches on the Faith-
Based Initiative in a 17-day stretch [upon the release of Unlevel
Playing Field ], and he has devoted more than 40 speeches explic-
itly to the Faith-Based Initiative – an average of more than one a
month.”66  Between 2001 and 2005, Bush’s remarks in support of
the Initiative have invariably incorporated claims that govern-
ment programs and bureaucrats purposefully discriminate
against religion.67  As Bush stated at the First White House Na-
tional Conference on Faith-Based and Community Initiatives on
June 1, 2004: “[W]e will reverse regulations that discriminate
against faith-based organizations.  There were regulations on the
books that made it nearly impossible for people of faith [to par-
64 Id.  at 180-81 (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Equal Treatment and Religious
Discrimination , in EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY 48
(Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998)).
65 See ANNE FARRIS ET AL., THE ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION AND SOC. WEL-
FARE, THE EXPANDING ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY: GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE
FAITH-BASED INITIATIVE 7  (2004) (“Unlevel Playing Field became the backbone of
an administrative strategy to encourage governmental partnerships with faith-based
organizations.”).
66 Id.  at 5.
67 See , Press Release, The White House, President Highlights Faith-Based Initia-
tive at Leadership Conference (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/re-
leases/2005/03/20050301-4.html (“[We must] continue to build our culture of
compassion by making sure state and local agencies do not discriminate against
faith-based and community programs when they hand out federal dollars.”); Press
Release, The White House, President Speaks with Faith-Based and Community
Leaders (Jan. 15, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/
20040115-7.html (“[O]ur governments have, frankly, discriminated against faith-
based programs.  It’s the truth.”); Press Release, The White House, President Dis-
cusses Faith-Based Initiative at Power Center Celebration (Sept. 12, 2003),   http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030912-14.html (“The discrimination
against faith-based programs at the federal level prevents us from using all our re-
sources to save lives. . . . And so one of my missions is to work with people to end
the discrimination in Washington, D.C. against faith-based programs.”); Press Re-
lease, The White House, President Bush Implements Key Elements of his Faith-
Based Initiative (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2002/12/
20021212-3.html (“Many acts of discrimination – many acts of discrimination against
faith-based groups are committed by Executive Branch agencies.”).
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ticipate].”68  In an earlier speech to religious and civic leaders in
Houston, President Bush remarked:
. . . [I]n Washington, D.C., there is an attitude that we should
not welcome faith-based programs into the budgets of our
government.
. . . .
. . . [T]he groups that apply have to change their board of di-
rectors in order to access the money, or have to take the cross
off the wall, in the case of the Christian faith-based program.
But it’s hard to be a faith-based program if you can’t practice
faith.  If the effectiveness of the program is based upon faith,
our government must allow that program to practice its
faith.69
And in a December 2002 speech to 1600 religious leaders in
Philadelphia, Bush promised to “clear away a legacy of discrimi-
nation against faith-based charities,” stating “[t]he days of dis-
criminating against religious groups just because they are
religious are coming to an end.”70
Other Administration officials have made similar claims that
the Faith-Based Initiative is needed to correct for pervasive dis-
crimination against religious groups.  In December 2003, then-
Attorney General John Ashcroft, the author of Charitable
Choice, spoke at a White House faith-based conference in
Tampa, Florida.  “For many years, faith-based and other commu-
nity groups were prohibited from competing for federal fund-
ing,” Ashcroft remarked.71  “Charitable Choice was intended to
level and broaden the playing field so that secular and sacred
organizations could have an equal opportunity to cooperate with
government and bring the most effective programs to help feed
the hungry, heal the sick, and shelter the homeless.”72
The former and current directors of the OFBCI, John DiIulio
and Jim Towey, have made similar claims of government discrim-
ination against NGOs that are either religiously affiliated or run
religiously integrated programs.  DiIulio, now a professor at the
68 See  Press Release, The White House, America’s Compassion in Action (June 1,
2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040601-10.html.
69 President Discusses Faith-Based Initiative at Power Center Celebration, supra
note 67.
70 President Bush Implements Key Elements of his Faith-Based Initiative, supra
note 67.
71 Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks at the White House Faith-
Based Conference (Dec. 5, 2003), http://justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003/
agfull120503.htm.
72 Id.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-3\ORE302.txt unknown Seq: 16  7-FEB-06 13:33
740 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
University of Pennsylvania, has written that “[t]here is growing
evidence that grassroots nonprofit social service organizations,
especially small community-serving religious groups that serve
primarily low-income urban Latino and African-American chil-
dren, youth, and families, are discriminated against at each and
every stage of the government-by-proxy process.”73
These claims of government discrimination against religion
find their basis in various sources.  On the most basic level, as is
demonstrated by many of the President’s remarks, claims of dis-
crimination often rely on anecdotal accounts of unjustified deni-
als of FBO applications or hostile regulation of religious
providers.74  The authenticity of many such accounts has been
difficult to document.  According to the Roundtable on Religion
and Social Welfare Policy, many funding decisions are made at a
subcontract or intermediary level, and government agencies are
often unaware of the religious character of an ultimate grant re-
cipient.75  Even assuming the basic accuracy of some anecdotal
accounts, they usually do not indicate whether nondiscriminatory
reasons for a particular denial may have existed (e.g., failure to
complete application materials, lack of match between proposal
and program goals, etc.).  A second source for discrimination
claims is statistical data indicating that FBOs have received mini-
mal amounts of government funding under certain programs.
Unlevel Playing Field relies heavily on such disparities to con-
clude the existence of religious discrimination.76  Some Charita-
73 John J. DiIulio, Jr., Response Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview , 116
HARV. L. REV. 1271, 1277 (2003); see also  Statement by Jim Towey, Director
OFBCI, available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/message.html
(“All too often, however, these worthy organizations are excluded from delivering
services for which the federal government commits substantial resources. Many are
prohibited from applying simply because they have a religious name or identity,
even though their programs may be turning lives around.”).
74 See  President Bush Implements Key Elements of his Faith-Based Initiative,
supra note 67, (identifying incidents of discrimination based on the name of a FBO
and the composition of a FBO’s board of directors).
75 LISA M. MONTIEL, THE ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION AND SOC. WELFARE POL-
ICY, THE USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS FOR DELIVERY OF FAITH-BASED HUMAN SERVICES
1-2, 25 (2d ed. 2003) (“It is difficult to determine how much public funding is going
to faith-based human service programs because of the fragmentation of funding au-
thority, the lack of centralized monitoring of the contracts, and the deficiency of
documentation of any religious affiliation of the contracted organization.”).
76 THE WHITE HOUSE, UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD, supra  note 27, at 5-7; AMY L.
SHERMAN, COLLABORATIONS CATALOGUE: A REPORT ON CHARITABLE CHOICE IM-
PLEMENTATION IN 15 STATES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  4 (2002), http://www. hud-
sonfaithincommunities.org/articles/FinalExecSummBroch.pdf.
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ble Choice proponents have interpreted funding discrepancies as
“prima facie” evidence of discrimination.77  However, as ad-
dressed below in greater detail, such data-based claims rarely
provide information on the number of successful applications by
FBOs or, again, the reasons why some applications may not have
been accepted.  Third, some discrimination claims are directed at
burdensome regulations, both in the application process and in
subsequent implementation and review.78  While proponents ac-
knowledge that most regulations are not overtly anti-religious or
even religion specific, they assert their secularizing pressure dis-
suades participation by religious groups.79  In particular, federal,
state, and local program prohibitions against employment dis-
crimination are seen as discriminating against FBOs that hire co-
religionists to administer their social programs.80  Finally, the dis-
crimination argument rests in part on disagreement with prior
Supreme Court holdings against funding pervasively sectarian in-
stitutions and programs.  Legal scholars such as Carl Esbeck and
now-appellate judge Michael McConnell, bolstered by a 2000
plurality decision of the Supreme Court,81 argue that rules re-
stricting government funding of groups or programs that infuse
spirituality and religious tenets into their services amount to “an
unconstitutional penalty on religion.”82
Since taking office, President Bush’s efforts to expand congres-
sional authorization for Charitable Choice have stalled, primarily
over the issue of whether Charitable Choice facilitates govern-
ment-funded religious discrimination through the express em-
ployment exemptions contained in 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f).83
Consequently, in December 2002, President Bush issued Execu-
tive Order 13279 creating two new faith-based offices in the De-
partment of Agriculture and the Agency for International
Development and authorizing all federal departments to imple-
ment Charitable Choice consistent with existing law.84  In June
77 STEPHEN V. MONSMA & CAROLYN M. MOUNTS, WORKING FAITH: HOW RELIG-
IOUS ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDE WELFARE-TO-WORK SERVICES 14 (2002).
78 Id.  at 20-22.
79 GLENN, supra  note 26, at 42-61.
80 Id.  at 192-211. See generally ESBECK, supra  note 5.
81 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 826-29 (2000).
82 Esbeck, supra  note 25, at 180-85; Michael W. McConnell, Equal Treatment and
Religious Discrimination , in STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER,
EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 48, 51 (1998).
83 FARRIS ET AL., supra  note 65, at 12.
84 Id.  at 5.
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2004, Bush issued an additional executive order adding FBCI of-
fices in four other federal agencies.85  According to one observer,
the purpose of these executive orders was “to implement admin-
istratively as much of the Faith-Based Initiative as possible,”
without having to rely on congressional authorization.86
Finally, since 2001, the OFBCI, in conjunction with the various
agency FBCI offices, has sponsored several regional conferences
to drum up support for the Faith-Based Initiative and encourage
congregations, small interchurch agencies, and other FBOs to ap-
ply for federal and state grants.87  High-level administration offi-
cials, including former Attorney General John Ashcroft and
former HUD Secretary Mel Martinez, have keynoted many of
these conferences.88  Critics of the Faith-Based Initiative have
charged that some of the conferences and other events sponsored
by the White House have overemphasized the religious side of
the Initiative, with the sessions taking on the characteristics of “a
tent revival [rather] than a government-sponsored information
session.”89
More recently, the White House has been able to claim a de-
gree of success for its efforts.  In May 2004, the OFBCI an-
nounced preliminary results indicating that federal grants to
FBOs have increased dramatically since 2001.  Of the $144 billion
awarded in 140 federal non-formula competitive grants, 8%—ap-
proximately $1.7 billion—went to FBOs.90  The Departments of
Health and Human Services and Housing and Urban Develop-
ment reported a combined increase of $144 million in grants to
FBOs in fiscal year 2003, with HHS increasing its grants to FBOs
by 41%, and HUD funding increasing by 16%.91  Both Depart-
ments also reported an increase in the number and dollar
amounts given to first-time FBO applicants.92  These grants have
funded a variety of FBO-run programs such as abstinence educa-
tion, child care and mentoring services, and marriage promo-
tion.93  In 2005, the White House announced that funding of
85 Id.  (Departments of Commerce and Veterans Affairs, the Small Business Ad-
ministration, and the Corporation for National and Community Service).
86 Id.  at 7.
87 Id.  at 15.
88 See  Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft, supra  note 71.
89 FARRIS ET AL., supra  note 65, at 15.
90 Id.  at 18.
91 Id.  at 18, 22-27.
92 Id.  at 18.
93 Id.  at 22-25.
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FBOs in the previous year had surpassed $2 billion, accounting
for 10.3% of the total funding awarded through 151 programs, a
71% increase over 2003.94
Despite these apparent successes at increasing FBO participa-
tion in government-funded projects, the Bush Administration has
continued to allege ongoing government discrimination against
religious entities in the grant process.  In several speeches follow-
ing the OFBCI’s May 2004 funding announcement, President
Bush claimed the existence of government discrimination against
FBOs.95  As Bush reasserted on March 1, 2005, at a White House
Faith-Based Initiative Leadership Conference, “there are some
roadblocks – such as the culture inside government at the fed-
eral, state and local level that is unfriendly to faith-based
organizations.”96
That the Administration has persisted with its claims of relig-
ious discrimination in light of its own evidence of success has led
some to charge that electoral politics have been behind the Initi-
ative and the White House–sponsored events.97  Critics allege
that the White House has used the Initiative to build a political
base among low-income and minority constituencies that might
otherwise vote Democratic, with government discrimination
against churches serving as the wedge issue, particularly among
black churches.  At these events, the promise of faith-based fund-
ing was allegedly used as a get-out-the-vote motivator.98  Accord-
94 See  Nancy Cook Laver, State Funding for Faith-Based Groups on the Rise , TAL-
LAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, March 20, 2005, available at  http://www.religionandsocial
policy.org/news/article.cfm?id=2500.
95 See  America’s Compassion in Action, supra note 68; President Highlights
Faith-Based Initiative at Leadership Conference, supra  note 67;  Press Release, The
White House, President’s Remarks via Satellite to the Southern Baptist Convention
(June 15, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2004/06/20040615-9.html.
96 See  President Highlights Faith-Based Initiative at Leadership Conference,
supra  note 67.
97 See  Rob Boston, Bush’s Faith-Based Revival , CHURCH & ST., Mar. 2004, availa-
ble at  http://www.au.org.; Ori Nir, Study Suggests Faith-Based Effort Used as a Parti-
san Tool , THE FORWARD, Oct. 1, 2004, available at  http://www.religionandsocial
policy.org/news/article/cfm?id=1974; see also JO RENEE FORMICOLA, MARY C.
SEGERS & PAUL WEBER, FAITH BASED INITIATIVES AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRA-
TION: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 149-150 (2003).
98 See  Boston, supra  note 97 (“The renewed push also gives Bush an entrée into
the African-American community, a segment of the population that remains largely
unsupportive of the president.  During his speech at Bethel African Methodist Epis-
copal Church in New Orleans [on January 15, 2004], a black congregation near a
public-housing complex, Bush promoted the ‘faith-based’ initiative and the idea of
government funding of religiously tinged social services in a hard-hit area. Bush po-
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ing to one report, in the summer leading up to the 2002 midterm
congressional election, federal faith-based officials appeared at
Republican-sponsored events and alongside Republican candi-
dates in at least six states.
The events often targeted black audiences, including one
South Carolina event sponsored by the state Republican Party
and attended by 300 black ministers, who later received letters
on GOP stationary containing instructions on how to apply for
grant money.  In the days before the [2002] election, White
House OFBCI Director Jim Towey also made a 20-city tour to
promote the Faith-Based Initiative.  And in the run-up to what
is expected to be another close presidential election in 2004,
OFBCI regional conferences have been held in battleground
states where votes might prove decisive in the outcome.99
According to earlier reports, White House politicization of the
Initiative was the reason John DiIulio resigned as Director of the
OFBCI in 2002.  DiIulio apparently felt the Initiative “was not
about ‘compassionate conservatism,’ as originally promised, but
rather a political giveaway to the Christian right, a way to consol-
idate and energize that part of the base.”100
To be sure, all Presidents use popular programs and policies to
garner political support.  That politics was a by-product of the
Faith-Based Initiative is not particularly troubling, provided that
the primary rationale for the Initiative was legitimate: to “level
the playing field” by eliminating government discrimination
against religious entities that had been barred from participating
in government grants and social service programs.  Ending perva-
sive government discrimination against religion was the stated
justification for the Initiative.  The next Part of this Article exam-
ines that justification in light of earlier and subsequent studies of
Charitable Choice, including the 2002-2004 study of the Faith-
Based Initiative in Oregon that was commissioned by the Oregon
Law Commission.
litical strategists have talked openly about using the initiative to woo black support,
aware that drawing even a few percentage points of the African-American vote
away from the Democrats could make a difference in a tight election.”).
99 FARRIS ET AL., supra  note 65, at 16.
100 Ron Suskind, Without a Doubt , N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, (Magazine), at 44.
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II
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FAITH-BASED
INITIATIVE—OREGON AS A CASE STUDY
Congress enacted Charitable Choice to remove barriers to par-
ticipation by FBOs—both religiously affiliated agencies and
more religiously integrated entities—in government-funded so-
cial service programs.  Although Unlevel Playing Field focused
exclusively  on discrimination and barriers at the federal level, the
implications of the report extended to programs administered at
the state and local levels as well.  The four statutorily imple-
mented Charitable Choice programs are administered primarily
by the states through formula grants, so the “discrimination” cri-
tique applies equally to state and local programs.  Since 1996,
states have been required to follow Charitable Choice require-
ments when contracting for services that included monies
originating in these four programs.  But as discussed, the second-
term Clinton Administration did little to encourage states to im-
plement Charitable Choice, and most states continued to operate
according to prior practices.101  The question, therefore, was
whether continuing practices were discriminatory, as the Bush
Administration alleged.
During the 2001 Oregon Legislative Session, State Senator
Frank Shields introduced a resolution calling for a statewide
study of Oregon laws and policies that might inhibit participation
by faith-groups in social service programs administered and
funded by the State.102  Shields, a Democrat and former Method-
ist minister, expressed concern that possible legal and policy bar-
riers existed to prevent FBOs from receiving state contracts and
grants for their human service programs.103  Even though
Shields’ resolution did not pass the state legislature, he requested
that the Oregon Law Commission conduct a study of the Faith-
Based Initiative in Oregon.104  The Law Commission—a non-
partisan state commission established to study and recommend
improvements in state law—agreed and adopted a work plan to
study publicly funded social service delivery by nonprofits and
101 See CTR. FOR PUB. JUST., STATES FAIL CHARITABLE CHOICE CHECK-UP
(2000), http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyreader$295; Sherman, supra  note 59.
102 See  S.J. Res. 39, 71st Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2001).
103 For a description of Senator Shields’ background and interest in Charitable
Choice issues, see http://www.leg.state.or.us/shields.
104 The bill history is found at http://www.leg.state.or.us/cgi-bin/searchMeas.p1.
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faith-based organizations in Oregon.105  The work plan directed
two inquires:
Identify and summarize various types of state laws, regula-
tions, rules, and official policies and procedures that govern
participation in or access to government programs, grants,
contracts, and facilities by community-based and faith-based
organizations.
Examine the various laws, regulations, rules, and policies
and procedures in relation to current federal and state statu-
tory and constitutional law, including “Charitable Choice” law
contained in the 1996 Welfare Reform Act and subsequent
federal laws, to see whether the former are consistent with
federal and state constitutional law or whether they inconsis-
tently allow for greater participation or unnecessarily restrict
participation in state administered social service programs or
impose burdens on such participation.106
The preliminary report, issued in December 2003, addressed
four interrelated issues: Oregon’s current and past practice in
contracting with FBOs and NGOs; whether any internal adminis-
trative practices affected state contracts and grants with FBOs;
whether there were any existing state statutes and regulations
governing participation by FBOs; and whether any statutory or
regulatory changes were needed to conform Oregon law to Char-
itable Choice requirements.107  As part of the study, members of
the work group met with various state and local officials respon-
sible for administering programs covered by Charitable Choice
and with religious leaders and administrators of state and local
FBOs.108
105 Members of the Oregon Law Commission include the State Attorney General,
the Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, the deans (or their representatives)
of the three Oregon law schools, six members of the bar and public appointed
equally by the Governor, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House.
Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde serves as a member of the Com-
mission.  During the period of this study, the Commission was chaired by Republi-
can Representative Lane Shedderly.  The Commission is housed at Willamette
University College of Law in Salem.
106 See REPORT, supra note 33, at 1.
107 Id.
108 The work group reporter met with state officials responsible for administering
the following programs covered by Charitable Choice:  Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (job skills, child care, refugee resettlement, child safety/foster care,
self-sufficiency, mental health, and substance abuse), which is administered by the
DHS Offices of Children, Adults, and Families and Community Health Services;
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), which is
administered through the DHS Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse; Community Ser-
vice Block Grant, which is administered through the Oregon Housing and Commu-
nity Services Department (OHCSD); and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA),
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-3\ORE302.txt unknown Seq: 23  7-FEB-06 13:33
The Rhetoric and Reality of the Faith-Based Initiative 747
A. Oregon’s Past Practice in Contracting with FBOs
and NGOs
Those state officials responsible for administering various so-
cial service programs indicated that Oregon has a long history of
contracting and subcontracting with NGOs, including FBOs.109
According to these officials, this practice predated Charitable
Choice and, to a large degree, has continued unaffected by the
Charitable Choice laws.
A systematic review of contract data for the Department of
Human Services (DHS) indicated that DHS had sixty-one
funded contracts with FBOs in 2003 (excluding contracts for
medical-health services and residential care facilities and adop-
tions) with an approximate dollar amount of $9,248,489.110  Of
that number, forty-eight contracts likely involved federal monies
from Charitable Choice and other federal programs, with an ag-
gregate dollar amount of $7,765,592.111  Examples of recent con-
tracts or grants included the following:
In 2003, DHS contracts with Catholic Community Services
of the Mid-Willamette Valley amounted to $2,039,614 for ser-
vices such as shelter, foster care training, and family counsel-
ing.  According to the Director of Catholic Community
Services, this amount had been relatively consistent for several
years.
In 2003, DHS contracts with Lutheran Community Services
which is administered through the Department of Community Colleges and
Workforce Development.  In addition, the reporter met with officials in the DHS
Contracts and Procurement Unit and the Attorney General’s Office regarding state
contracting requirements.  Finally, because many of these programs are run at the
local level by counties, DHS service delivery area offices, and community action
agencies, the reporter also met with administrators in the Marion County Health
Department, SDA Region Three (serving Marion, Polk, and Yamhill counties) and
the Mid-Willamette Valley Community Action Agencies.
The reporter also met with representatives from Catholic Community Services,
the Catholic Conference of Oregon, the United Methodist Church, Lutheran Family
Services, the Jewish Federation, the Seventh-day Adventist Pacific Conference, Ecu-
menical Ministries of Oregon (an interchurch agency of mainstream Protestant
churches), and the Salem Leadership Foundation (a FBO intermediary representing
evangelical churches).  The reporter also attended several meetings of a DHS-spon-
sored FBO advisory/discussion group.
109 Id.  at 3-6.  In the report, the term “contracting” included both direct contracts
between the State and an NGO/FBO and indirect subcontracts, whereby a state
agency contracts with a county, community college, or CAA, which in turn contracts
with an NGO/FBO.
110 In 2003, the State had nineteen contracts with FBOs for in-state and out-of-
state adoptions for a total amount of $447,500. Id.  at 5.
111 Id.
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Northwest amounted to $2,212,931 for services including
adoptions, parent training, alcohol and drug counseling, and
sex abuse treatment.
DHS maintains various contracts with St. Mary’s Home for
Boys for residential placement and treatment.  In 2003, con-
tract amounts totaled $2,310,777.
DHS Office of Alcohol and Drug Treatment contracts with
Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon for treatment programs
through Oxford House.
In 2002, DHS and Oregon Housing and Community Ser-
vices Department (OHCSD) provided a grant of $200,000 to
the Gospel Mission in Grants Pass for shelter and alcohol and
drug rehabilitation housing.
DHS administers various contracts with Ecumenical Minis-
tries of Oregon, Lutheran Social Services, Catholic Charities,
and the Jewish Federation for refugee work.112
This 2003 contract data indicated that all DHS contracts were
with either national religiously affiliated agencies (e.g., Catholic
Charities/Community Services, St. Vincent de Paul, Lutheran
Family Services) or local/regional independent religious agencies
(e.g., Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon, St. Mary’s Home for
Boys).  During this time, DHS had no direct contracts with con-
gregations, although state officials indicated that regional DHS
service delivery area offices (SDAs), counties, and community
action agencies (CAAs) subcontracted with congregations.  Ex-
amples of state contracts involving federal funds administered at
the local level during the 2002-2003 period included:
Marion County Health Department had several contracts
with Catholic Community Services to provide mental health,
developmentally disabled, and crisis services (using
SAMHSA, Medicaid, and state funds) (approximately
$1,000,000).
Mid-Willamette Valley Community Action Agency con-
tracted with Catholic Community Services and St. Joseph’s
Catholic Church (Mt. Angel) to provide emergency shelter
(using CSBG funds, among others) (approximately $36,400).
DHS Service Delivery Area Three (Marion, Polk, and
Yamhill Counties) contracted with Catholic Community Ser-
vices to provide foster care, job skills, mental health, and drug
services (using TANF funds, among others) (annualized
amount: $336,012).
In 2002-2003, Multnomah County reported having partner-
ships with more than thirty FBOs, with at least nine involving
some form of subcontracting or public grants.  Some of these
112 See id.  at 4.
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partnerships had existed for twelve to fifteen years.113
State officials did not keep independent records of the relig-
ious identity of subcontractors.114
No attempt was made to compile an exhaustive list of state-
administered programs and contracts with FBOs that involve
Charitable Choice funding.  This approach was selected for sev-
eral reasons.  First, most federal formula grants allow states to
use monies in existing state programs or to structure programs to
meet their particular needs, resulting in many state-specific pro-
grams being funded through a combination of state and federal
sources.  As a result, there are few Oregon programs that are
distinctly federal Charitable Choice programs.115  Second, none
of the state departments or offices distinguished FBOs from
other entities with which they contract. In essence, neither DHS
nor any other agency had a procedure or mechanism in place to
track the number (or identity) of FBOs that contract with the
State , a practice that is consistent with that in many states.116
The above data on FBO participation was compiled manually but
was supported through anecdotal information;117 however, there
is no reason to assume that this information is inaccurate.118
Although the bulk of federal Charitable Choice grants are ad-
ministered through DHS, the report also gathered information
from the Oregon Housing and Community Services Department,
which administers Community Service Block Grant monies,
among other funding sources.  OHCSD identified twenty-nine di-
113 Id.
114 Id.  at 5-7.
115 Id.  at 5.
116 Id. ; see also MARK RAGAN ET AL., THE ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION AND SOC.
WELFARE POLICY, SCANNING THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR FAITH-BASED SO-
CIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS OF A 50-STATE STUDY 4-5, 9
(2003).
117 In 2001, DHS TANF program analyst Jeff Stell compiled an informal district
or county list of funded and unfunded “partnerships” between the State and FBOs.
The list indicates 406 partnerships with approximately 200 FBOs for services, includ-
ing food and clothing banks, housing and shelter referrals, teen pregnancy/parenting
and domestic violence counseling, transportation, and medical assistance. REPORT,
supra  note 33, at 5.
118 Ramona Rodermaker, the DHS official responsible for liaison with the faith
community, estimated that between 2001 and 2003 DHS had 115 contracts with
FBOs totaling approximately $12.5 million. Shelly Oppel, Oregon Resists Initiative
as Bush Revives Faith-Based Goal , THE OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Feb. 9, 2003, at
B1.  These figures did not include state Medicaid contracts with several religiously
affiliated hospitals.
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rect grants to FBOs between 1999 and 2003, involving federal
and state monies in the amount of $2,117,696.119  For example,
between 2000 and 2003, OHCSD administered three grants for
transitional housing to St. Vincent de Paul of Lane County in the
amounts of $175,000, $175,000, and $696,696.120  Other FBO con-
tracting partners included Oregon Mennonite Residential Ser-
vices, Gospel Rescue Mission of Grants Pass, and Habitat for
Humanity.121
In summary, the report revealed that Oregon’s social service
agencies have had a long and active practice of contracting with
FBOs for the delivery of social services to Oregonians.  In fiscal
year 2003, state contracts with and grants to FBOs exceeded
$11.8 million, excluding contracts with religiously affiliated medi-
cal and residential care facilities.122  Financial contracts involving
FBOs exceeded one hundred, while non-funded partnerships
with FBOs were possibly more than four hundred.123  The major-
ity of state-administered grants were with established religiously
affiliated providers; however, regional SDAs and CAAs did sub-
contract regularly with congregations and smaller FBOs.124  This
practice predated the passage of Charitable Choice and did not
appear to have changed, increased, or decreased as a result of the
federal legislation.
B. Agency Policies with Respect to Faith-Based Organizations
All state officials indicated that their staffs do not distinguish
between religiously based and nonreligiously based organizations
when it comes to awarding state contracts or grants.125  In es-
119 The bulk of OHCSD-administered funds are distributed to counties and
CAAs, which may subcontract or partner with FBOs at the local level.
120 REPORT, supra  note 33, at 4.
121 Id.  Relatedly, in 2003 the Oregon HUD office compiled a database that indi-
cated that at least $111 million had been awarded to FBOs in the State of Oregon
during the previous seven years. See MONTIEL, supra  note 75, at 25.
122 See REPORT, supra  note 33, at 5.
123 Id.  at n.7.
124 An OHCSD survey of local CAAs (ten of seventeen agencies reporting) indi-
cated 396 partnerships between CAAs and FBOs, with nineteen of that number in-
volving funded relationships.  The vast majority of these partnerships were with
congregations.  Apparently, the majority of the unfunded relationships were in the
nature of referrals.  The information contained in this survey covered several years
and is very incomplete.  For example, the Clackamas County CAA reported having
had partnerships with 195 FBOs but did not indicate the years covered, the services
provided, or whether the relationships were funded or unfunded.
125 REPORT, supra  note 33, at 6.
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sence, the state government has no policy or guideline restricting
or qualifying funding collaborations with FBOs.  Under Oregon
law, all prospective contractors are required to submit a Request
for Proposal (RFP) and meet the program and contract require-
ments.126  State officials indicated that they have had no reason
to inquire into the religious character of the contracting agencies
because NGOs and FBOs contract to perform particular secular
services pursuant to the RFP.127  Because of this “don’t ask” pol-
icy, state officials generally do not distinguish between perva-
sively sectarian (religiously integrated) FBOs and those that are
merely religiously affiliated.  In addition, because the RFP and
contract specify the services to be provided—which by their
description in the RFP are secular—state officials asserted (pos-
sibly naively) that the state will not be funding religious activi-
ties.128  By adopting this approach, state officials believed they
were relieved from having to review any funded program for re-
ligious content.
All state officials indicated a willingness to contract with FBOs
provided the organizations could demonstrate that they satisfy
the program requirements/goals.129  In fact, no program official
indicated that pervasively sectarian providers are ineligible to re-
ceive public funds, although a few speculated that a faith-inte-
grated approach might not satisfy the program requirements of
particular RFPs.130  Most officials expressed an awareness of po-
tential constitutional constraints in contracting with religious or-
ganizations, but none indicated that any such problems had
arisen with the contracts under their supervision.131  Although
some of these responses could have been self-serving, the re-
porter did not sense any hesitation or reticence on the part of
state officials to contract with FBOs, other than a vague aware-
ness that some constitutional limits exist.132  On the contrary,
several officials referred to long-standing relationships with es-
tablished FBOs and expressed their expectations that those con-
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official indicated that the religious character of the FBO was ir-
relevant provided that it met the contract requirements, while
some stated that they were not concerned whether a FBO en-
gaged in unfunded religious activity in conjunction with a state
contract.134  Conversely, absent two exceptions, no official indi-
cated that his office or program had made special efforts to ex-
pand its contracting with FBOs or to recruit underrepresented
FBOs to submit RFPs.135
In summary, based on information gathered through the inter-
views and supported with state contracting records, Oregon so-
cial services agencies willingly contract with FBOs and have done
so for a long time.  Most of those collaborations have been with
the larger, established social service FBOs (e.g., Catholic Com-
munity Services, Lutheran Family/Community Services, Ecumen-
ical Ministries, the Salvation Army) with which the State has
long-standing relationships.  Apparently, few small FBOs and
congregations contract directly with the State, although state and
local agencies maintain contacts and unfunded partnerships (e.g.,
referrals) with many small FBOs.136  The bulk of these relation-
ships predate the implementation of Charitable Choice, and
funding levels have remained relatively constant, considering
funding cutbacks. Finally, the State does not have any official or
informal policies that govern or distinguish relationships with
FBOs, including any policies that exclude participation by perva-
sively sectarian organizations.  Conversely, the state agencies do
not, as a matter of practice, seek out new FBOs with which to
partner or contract.  Local government and community action
agencies are more proactive in developing new relationships with
NGOs, including FBOs.
Finally, the report asked religious leaders whether they had
been denied the opportunity to apply for state grants and con-
tracts or had otherwise experienced discrimination in their deal-
ings with the State or local governments.137  No religious official
134 Id.
135 In October 1999, the OHCSD initiated an agreement to purchase mortgages
held by Habitat for Humanity through its Residential Loan Program. Id.  at n.8.  This
arrangement has allowed Habitat for Humanity to expend more of its resources on
new home construction for low-income Oregonians. Id.  In addition, a DHS official
indicated that the agency has periodically approached Russian Orthodox churches
to assist in administering refugee and immigration services to Oregon’s Russian im-
migrant community.  (Notes on file with author).
136 See supra  note 119.
137 REPORT, supra  note 33, at app.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-3\ORE302.txt unknown Seq: 29  7-FEB-06 13:33
The Rhetoric and Reality of the Faith-Based Initiative 753
contacted indicated that their agency had received unfair treat-
ment because of its religious character.  Similarly, no religious
official indicated that the State had pressured their FBO to re-
move religious icons or artwork from its buildings or to change
the composition of its board of directors, or that the State had
communicated that the FBO was prohibited from hiring co-reli-
gionists.138  Contrary to the White House’s rhetoric, no religious
leader claimed that state or local officials were hostile to their
agencies or unwilling to work generally with FBOs.  The primary
barriers identified concerned unfamiliarity with the proposal and
contract process, the complexity and red tape associated with
contracting with the State, fear of state regulations, and potential
interference with the religious functions of FBOs.139  An addi-
tional complaint was that the State was not doing enough to re-
cruit new FBOs or provide training on the intricacies of the grant
and contracting process.140
C. The Oregon Experience Compared
The Oregon findings are consistent with empirical studies re-
garding FBO participation in government grants and contracts
that predate and postdate PRWORA.  If Charitable Choice has
“initiated” anything, it is an increase in the scholarly study of
religious involvement in social services.  Despite the rhetoric
from the White House, most studies have indicated that: (1)
FBOs—both the religiously integrated and religiously affiliated
varieties—have long partnered with the government to provide
social services—Charitable Choice is not so much a break from
the past practice but a continuation of long-standing collabora-
tions; (2) while some faith-integrated FBOs may have been hesi-
tant to apply for government grants and contracts due to fear of
burdensome regulations and red tape, smaller FBOs and congre-
gations are generally less likely than mainstream Protestant, Jew-
ish, and Catholic religiously affiliated entities to offer social
services or participate in Charitable Choice; (3) the vast majority
of FBOs report having favorable  working relationships with gov-
ernment agencies and officials; (4) government officials generally
have not interfered with the religious structure, operation, or ex-
138 Notes of interviews on file with author.
139 Interviews with Arlene Jensen, United Methodist Church (June 10, 2002), and
Sam Skillern, Salem Leadership Foundation (Aug. 7, 2002) (notes on file with
author).
140 Id.
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pression of FBO providers; and (5) the primary “barriers” or
complaints identified by FBOs involve bureaucratic require-
ments and regulations that are not directed at religious entities
but apply to all social service providers that partner with the gov-
ernment.  In essence, the studies indicate that government anti-
religious bias does not appear to be a problem.  What is particu-
larly significant is that much of this data was available before or
shortly after the Administration launched the Faith-Based Initia-
tive in 2001, but it had apparently little impact on the Adminis-
tration’s rhetoric of discrimination.  Each of these points is
considered in turn.
First, FBOs have long participated in government-funded and
unfunded social service grants and programs.141  Religious char-
ity work predates many government welfare programs.  For over
150 years, churches have run orphanages and homes for the aged
and provided adoption services, foodstuffs, clothing, housing, job
assistance, and counseling, often in the absence of government
programs.142  For example, in 1995 the Salvation Army served
over twenty-seven million people, while Catholic Charities
served eleven million.143  This does not count the thousands of
social service programs run by local agencies and congrega-
tions.144  In addition, many religiously affiliated agencies such as
Catholic Charities USA, Lutheran Social Services, and the Salva-
tion Army have long participated in government grants and con-
tracts to fund their programs.  In 1996, the year that Charitable
Choice was enacted, Catholic Charities USA received $1.3 billion
in public funding for its programming, accounting for 62% of its
overall budget.145  Catholic Charities USA has long been the
141 See  Theda Skocpol, Religion , Civil Society, and Social Provision in the U.S. , in
WHO WILL PROVIDE? THE CHANGING ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN SOCIAL
WELFARE 21-50 (Mary Jo Bane et al., eds., 2000); Ronald Thiemann et al., Responsi-
bilities and Risks for Faith-Based Organizations , in WHO WILL PROVIDE? THE
CHANGING ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE, supra , at 51, 53-57.
142 See REPORT, supra  note 33, at 6; see also DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOV-
ERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC
(1971); RONALD G. WALTERS, AMERICAN REFORMERS, 1815-1860 (1978).
143 See  Green, supra  note 13, at 36.
144 Stephen V. Monsma, The “Pervasively Sectarian” Standard in Theory and
Practice , 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 322 (1999) (documenting
a “lively, continuing partnership between government and nonprofit service organi-
zations, including faith-based ones”); John McCarthy & Jim Castelli, Religion-Spon-
sored Social Service Providers: The Not-So-Independent Sector , 23-31, 48-50 (1997),
available at  http://www.nonprofitresearch.org/usr_doc/25357.pdf.
145 See CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, at 24-25.  Interest-
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largest private social service agency in the nation and receives
more public funding than any other private nonprofit entity.
Though accounting for less of their budgets, the Salvation Army,
Lutheran, and Jewish social services have all received hundreds
of millions in public funds for their programs.146
To be sure, both historically and currently, the majority of
FBOs that participate in government-funded social service pro-
grams are the established religiously affiliated agencies such as
Catholic Charities USA, the Salvation Army, and the Jewish
Federations.  However, consistent with the Oregon practice,
studies indicate that state agencies have not rigorously distin-
guished between religiously affiliated and religiously integrated
organizations and programs when awarding grants and con-
tracts.147  Apparently, a disconnect has existed between judicial
holdings and actual practice,148 with pervasively sectarian entities
being active participants in the publicly funded social service net-
work.  As Amy L. Sherman testified before the House of Repre-
sentatives Subcommittee on the Constitution on April 24, 2001,
three months prior to the release of Unlevel Playing Field , “de-
spite significant media accounts to the contrary, conservative and
Evangelical faith-based organizations are notably involved in
charitable choice contracting.”149  These results were substanti-
ated by a 2002 study of forty-six Welfare-to-Work projects, which
found that over 40% of faith-integrated programs surveyed re-
ceived government funding.150  According to the report’s au-
thors, “[t]his indicates President Bush’s faith-based initiative . . .
is not a wholly new initiative or a sharp break with current prac-
tices; instead it is an attempt to regularize and expand what is an
existing public policy practice in the United States.”151  Thus,
contrary to the rhetoric of discrimination, pervasively religious
ingly, that percentage has not increased but rather has gone down slightly since the
enactment of Charitable Choice. See CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA 1999 ANNUAL RE-
PORT, at 21 (noting that government funds account for fifty-eight percent of Catholic
Charities’ total budget).
146 See  McCarthy & Castelli, supra  note 144, at 23-31, 48-50.
147 See MONSMA, supra  note 19, at 67-69.
148 See  Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1988).
149 See State and Local Implementation of Existing Charitable Choice Programs:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 27 (2001) [hereinafter State and Local Implementation Hearing] (testi-
mony of Amy L. Sherman, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute).
150 MONSMA & MOUNTS, supra  note 77, at 13-14.
151 Id.  at 14.
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organizations such as the Salvation Army and the Union Gospel
Missions have received public funding for their social service
programs.152
That said, there is little disagreement that the primary players
in the religious-provider system have been the larger, established
religiously affiliated providers.153  The Oregon Law Commission
Report substantiates this fact.  Whether this reflects an ingrained
government bias against smaller FBOs and congregations (which
tend to be more faith-integrated in their approaches) is difficult
to assess, but assuming Oregon is representative, two explana-
tions arise: (1) government agencies tend to work with the famil-
iar and established NGOs and are disinclined to seek out new
collaborators due to budgetary cutbacks and increased staff wor-
kloads; and (2) smaller FBOs and congregations often lack orga-
nizational infrastructure and familiarity with the contracting
process to be active participants.154  Nonetheless, faith-based
proponents argue that the Initiative is necessary to open the door
to smaller FBOs and congregations, many of which will likely
take a religiously integrated approach to government-funded ser-
vices.155  There is some evidence that the Initiative has en-
couraged greater participation by such entities, with a significant
increase in first-time participants.156  Charitable Choice may be a
catalyst to increased participation in government grants by
smaller and minority-based FBOs.157
On the other side, studies suggest that there may be a limit to
long-term participation in Charitable Choice by congregations
and smaller faith-integrated entities.  The assumption underlying
the Faith-Based Initiative has been that smaller congregations
and FBOs—the “armies of compassion”—are ready and willing
to participate in funded social service programs once the barriers
are lifted.  University of Arizona sociologist Mark Chaves has
been testing this assumption since 1999, utilizing data collected as
152 See GLENN, supra  note 26, at 212-25; MONSMA, supra  note 19, at 70-80.
153 See RAGAN ET AL., supra  note 116, at 22.
154 Interviews with Arlene Jensen, United Methodist Church (June 10, 2002), and
Sam Skillern, Salem Leadership Foundation (Aug. 7, 2002) (notes on file with
author).
155 See generally GLENN, supra  note 26; MONSMA, supra  note 19.
156 See JOHN C. GREEN & AMY L. SHERMAN, FRUITFUL COLLABORATIONS: A
SURVEY OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED FAITH-BASED PROGRAMS IN 15 STATES 14
(2002).
157 Id. ; Sherman, supra note 76, at 3-4; MONSMA & MOUNTS, supra note 77, at 10.
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part of the 1998 National Congregations Study.158  Chaves has
found that, contrary to those assumptions, only approximately
one-third of congregations expressed an interest in applying for
government funds to support social services programs.159  This is
the case even though approximately 85% of congregations offer
some form of social services.160  Additionally, theologically lib-
eral congregations traditionally provide more social services than
conservative/evangelical congregations, and interest in receiving
government funding is much greater among liberal to moderate
Protestant churches and Catholic congregations than among ev-
angelical churches, the archetype of the new FBO.161  Finally,
Chaves found that congregations favor particular types of social
service programs, such as housing, clothing, and food assistance
rather than engaging in long-term programs and commitments
dealing with health, education, domestic violence, tutoring/
mentoring, substance abuse, or job training.162  According to
Chaves, these findings lead to two conclusions: (1) the results
“contradict the widely held assumption that religious organiza-
tions provide social services in a distinctively holistic or personal
way”; and (2) the “assumption that charitable choice initiatives
are likely to involve new  sorts of religious congregations in pro-
viding publicly funded social services—those that have not been
involved before—is questionable.”163  While more recent studies
indicating an increase in collaboration by newer FBOs may con-
tradict some of Chaves’ findings, they generally support the con-
clusion that congregational participation in Charitable Choice
will likely be modest, both in the types of programs offered and
158 See  Mark Chaves, Testing the Assumptions: Who Provides Social Services? , in
SACRED PLACES, CIVIC PURPOSES 287, 287-96 (E.J. Dionne Jr. & Ming Hsu Chen
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Testing the Assumptions]; Mark Chaves & William Tsitsos,
Are Congregations Constrained by Government? Empirical Results from the National
Congregations Study , 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 335 (2000); Mark Chaves, Religious Con-
gregations and Welfare Reform: Who Will Take Advantage of “Charitable Choice”?,
64 AM. SOC. REV. 836-46 (1999) [hereinafter Religious Congregations].
159 See supra  note 158.
160 State and Local Implementation Hearing , supra note 149, at 28 (testimony of
Amy L. Sherman).  Chaves puts the figure of formal social service programs by con-
gregations at fifty-seven percent. Religious Congregations , supra  note 158, at 838.
161 Testing the Assumptions, supra  note 158, at 293.  Black congregations are five
times more likely than white congregations to apply for government funds for social
service programs. Religious Congregations , supra  note 158, at 841; see also  Anna
Greenberg, Doing Whose Work? Faith-Based Organizations and Government Part-
nerships , in WHO WILL PROVIDE?, supra  note 141, at 178.
162 Testing the Assumptions , supra  note 158, at 289.
163 Id.  at 289, 293.
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the number of clients served.164
More significant than the figures on FBO collaboration is the
survey data discussing the relationships between participating
FBOs and government social service agencies.  Consistent with
the Oregon Law Commission Report—and contrary to the rhet-
oric of discrimination—pre- and post-2001 studies indicate that
FBOs overwhelmingly have had favorable working relationships
with government agencies and officials.  Interestingly, several of
these studies were conducted by social scientists who support the
Faith-Based Initiative.  A 2002 study of faith-based programs in
fifteen states conducted by the Hudson Institute concluded that
“[f]ully 93 percent of the FBOs expressed satisfaction [with their
relationship with the government].  Overall, nearly one-half re-
ported that their experience with government was ‘very positive’
and 46 percent claimed a ‘somewhat positive’ experience.”165
The study went on to state that faith-based providers generally
did not see government officials as intrusive: “more than three-
fifths claimed there had been ‘very little intrusion’ and about
one-third reported only ‘some intrusion.’”166  This 2002 study
supports the 2001 testimony of one of its authors, Amy L. Sher-
man, before the House of Representatives approximately three
months before  the release of Unlevel Playing Field .  Sherman
testified that she had “uncovered almost no examples of faith-
based organizations [FBOs] that felt their religious expression
had been squelched in their collaborative relationship with gov-
ernment.”167  A separate 2002 faith-based study conducted by
Stephen V. Monsma for the Center for Research on Religion and
Urban Civil Society reached similar conclusions, describing it as
“noteworthy” that
[P]rograms of all types reported largely being satisfied with
their contacts with government . . . .  In fact, not one of the 18
faith-based/integrated programs receiving government funds
(the very programs one would expect would most likely have
run into this problem) reported having to curtail any of their
164 Green & Sherman, supra  note 156, at 15.
165 Id.  at 27.
166 Id.
167 State and Local Implementation Hearing, supra note 149, at 17 (testimony of
Amy L. Sherman).  Sherman made the same observation one year earlier in a pre-
liminary review of her findings in nine states, noting that “the study uncovered al-
most no examples of FBOs who felt their religious expression had been ‘squelched’
in their collaborative relationship with government.”  Amy Sherman, Should We Put
Faith in Charitable Choice? , RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Fall 2000, at 22, 26.
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religious practices.168
These studies directly contradict the Administration’s claims
that the government has discriminated against the religious char-
acter of FBOs.
These findings cannot be attributed to the educational efforts
of the White House OFBCI as most of the data was gathered
before or early into the Bush administration and substantiates
published research that predates the Initiative.169  As Professor
Monsma wrote in 1996, not only are “deeply religious organiza-
tions able to participate fully in this partnership, but they are also
apparently able to do so without having to compromise—for the
most part—their religious missions as they see them.”170  In addi-
tion, these conclusions were substantiated by a fifty-state study
conducted by the Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare
Policy in 2003, which reported there are no state requirements
that participating FBOs alter their organizational structure so as
to minimize religious influences and that only one state required
FBOs to remove religious art, icons, scripture, etc., in their places
of funded service.171
Finally, empirical studies indicate that the primary “barriers”
to FBO participation in government programs do not concern
issues of discrimination or systematic bias but involve complaints
about uniform regulations: application forms and prerequisites;
licensing, insurance, and indemnification requirements; employ-
ment restrictions; and general government bureaucratic red tape.
As one pro-Initiative report concluded, “[t]here was little pattern
to the complaints of the dissatisfied FBOs: they appear to be
largely idiosyncratic, perhaps reflecting the peculiarities of the
particular organizations or government officials. . . .  Burden-
some reporting – ‘red tape’ – was the chief cause of com-
168 MONSMA & MOUNTS, supra  note 77, at 17-18 (noting that seventy percent of
FBOs report that they are very or usually satisfied with their contacts with govern-
ment).  “Many may be surprised at the lack of reported government limitations on
religious practices in programs it helps fund.  The more one actually gets out in the
field and observes on-going programs, the more irrelevant many of the Washington
and academic government-funding debates appear.” Id.  at 18.
169 See MONSMA, supra  note 19, at 98 (noting that “70 percent or more [religious
nonprofits] reported no problems [in their relationships with the government].”).
170 Id. ; see also  Chaves & Tsitsos, supra  note 158, at 342 (“[I]t is extraordinarily
uncommon for congregations to be denied permission by government authorities to
engage in the activities in which they wish to engage.”).
171 RAGAN ET AL., supra  note 116, at 15.  The identity of the state was not
provided.
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plaint.”172  Importantly, none of the studies reported that states
were imposing requirements solely on FBOs; rather, the com-
plaints concerned general state regulations that apply irrespec-
tive of the religious or secular identity of a provider.
Regulations can have more than one effect.  First, they can
serve as “gatekeepers”—a way for state officials to weed out re-
ligious providers or dissuade them from engaging in the grant/
contract process.  Second, regulations can have a debilitating ef-
fect on participating FBOs by requiring that they compromise
some of their religious values by altering their programs, leading
to secularization of their religious mission (i.e., “mission
creep”).173  There is little evidence to substantiate the first claim,
as it contradicts data discussed above about ongoing and positive
collaborations between governments and FBOs, including those
that are religiously-integrated.  According to a 2000 study by
Professor Chaves, approximately one-fifth of congregations na-
tionwide have sought licenses or permits for activities such as day
care, soup kitchens, or building expansion, with only one percent
reportedly having been denied.174  “The nearly universal experi-
ence of American congregations seeking government authoriza-
tion to do something they want to do is one of facilitation rather
than roadblock.”175
There is more evidence of the second effect of regulations on
FBOs—that they sometimes impose a Hobson’s choice between
participating in a government grant and compromising some re-
ligious tenet or value.176  Oregon, like many states, requires all
NGOs with state contracts to have liability insurance, indemnify
the state, conduct criminal background checks, and make availa-
ble for inspection all “books, documents, papers and records di-
rectly pertinent to the contract for the purpose of making
audit[s], examination[s], excerpts and transcripts.”177  Oregon
also requires certification for all substance abuse counselors
working in programs that are state funded, licensed, or ap-
172 Green & Sherman, supra  note 156, at 34.
173 LOCONTE, supra  note 26, at 33-54; GLENN, supra  note 26, at 225-34, 241-47.
174 Chaves & Tsitsos, supra  note 158, at 341 (“[O]f the 429 congregations that
sought a permit/license in [1999], only 5 (1 percent) reported having been denied .”).
These results are consistent with a national study of congregations by the Presbyte-
rian Church (U.S.A.). Id.
175 Id.
176 See LOCONTE, supra  note 26, at 33-54.
177 OR. ADMIN. R. 125-020-0400(3) (2005).
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proved.178  Such regulations and accompanying oversight may
appear unduly invasive to some smaller FBOs who fear not only
the increased reporting workload, but the subtle secularizing ef-
fect of standardization as well.
Conversely, there is also some evidence that nonparticipating
FBOs engage in a fair amount of self-selection with respect to
government regulations.179  According to one study, “fear for
their religious freedom, a more general fear of cumbersome,
time-consuming government regulations, or not being able to
pursue the programs they feel called to pursue (or all three)” are
the primary factors dissuading congregations and small FBOs
from participating in government-funded programs.180  Based on
a study discussed above, however, many of these fears are unsub-
stantiated, as the vast majority of those FBOs that do participate
in government programs report few complaints.181
Requiring FBOs to surrender their ability to hire coreligionists
for government-funded staff positions presents a unique “bar-
rier,” as such requirements may undermine the ability of a FBO
to maintain a distinctive and collective working ethos.182  As
mentioned, the various Federal Charitable Choice statutes con-
tain express provisions that allow FBOs to enter into public con-
tracts while retaining the ability to discriminate in employment
decisions on religious grounds.  This privilege is based on an ex-
emption to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, otherwise
known as § 702, which provides that the Title VII prohibition on
178 OAR 415-051-0057 requirements for certification include 750 hours of super-
vised experience in alcohol/drug abuse counseling, 150 contact hours of education
and training in alcoholism and drug abuse related subjects, and successful comple-
tion of a written examination or portfolio review by the certifying body.
OAR 415-051-0055 sets out the minimum requirements for certification as a
clinical supervisor, which may include a combination of college education and work
experience.  In addition, a supervisor must have 4000 hours of supervised experience
in alcohol/drug abuse counseling, 300 contact hours of education and training in
alcoholism and drug abuse related subjects, and successful completion of a written
examination or portfolio review by the certifying body.
179 See MONSMA & MOUNTS, supra  note 77, at 14 (“The reason faith-based orga-
nizations most frequently gave for not receiving government funds was a self-con-
scious decision not to seek government funds.”).
180 Id.  at 15. (“[T]he seemingly endless paperwork and a fear of not being able to
pursue certain desired programs seem to play as large a role in staying away from
government funding as does the fear of compromising their faith-based practices.”).
181 See  Green & Sherman, supra  note 60, at 3 (indicating that ninety-two percent
of FBOs maintained they would seek a similar government contract in the future).
182 See GLENN, supra  note 26, at 196-99; see also ESBECK ET AL., supra  note 5, at
87-98.
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employment discrimination “shall not apply to . . . [religious enti-
ties] with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
[entity] of its activities.”183  In 1987, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of this religious exemption.184
Three caveats limit the breadth of this exemption.  Most im-
portantly, even though Charitable Choice expressly allows FBOs
to retain their Title VII exemption for religious-based employ-
ment practices, the federal law does not preempt state laws that
impose different requirements.185  Second, courts have univer-
sally held that religious organizations remain subject to the other
prohibitions under Title VII, such that a FBO cannot make em-
ployment decisions based on race, gender, or national origin.186
And third, it is unclear whether the § 702 exemption applies in
situations where the positions or activities are funded with public
monies.  Section 702 does not speak to this issue, and the Su-
preme Court’s 1987 decision involved employment positions that
were privately  funded.187  While most scholars agree that a relig-
ious organization does not lose its § 702 exemption merely by
receiving some public funding (e.g., a church-related hospital
may receive Medicare funds or may be awarded Hill-Burton
grant monies without forfeiting its ability to hire a chaplain of its
own faith), they are split over whether the exemption would ap-
ply to particular positions that are publicly funded.188  In 2003,
the White House OFBCI released a paper supporting arguments
that FBOs should retain their ability to discriminate on religious
grounds when engaged in publicly funded contracts.189
A general requirement of employment nondiscrimination
would have a gatekeeping affect, with many religiously inte-
183 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2000).
184 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987).
185 See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(k).
186 E.g. , Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166
(4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Pac. Press Pub. Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982).
187 See  Green, supra  note 1, at 37. Recently, a federal district court has held that a
religious grant recipient may engage in religious employment discrimination without
violating the Establishment or Equal Protection clauses.  See Lown v. The Salvation
Army, 2005 WL 2415978 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005).
188 Compare Esbeck, supra  note 26, with  Green, supra  note 1.
189 See WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF FAITH-BASED AND CMTY. INITIATIVES, PROTECT-
ING THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS:
WHY RELIGIOUS HIRING RIGHTS MUST BE PRESERVED, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/government/fbci/booklet.pdf.
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grated FBOs opting not to participate in funding programs.190
While the debate over the appropriateness of making all funded
contracts and programs subject to the same nondiscrimination re-
quirement continues in Washington and academia,191 the fact is
that current Charitable Choice regulations allow FBOs to engage
in such practices, and few if any states have imposed different
requirements.  According to a 2003 Roundtable study, most
states follow the § 702 exemption and allow for employment de-
cisions on the basis of religion, even in funded programs.192
Studies also indicate a majority of FBOs that rely on staff rather
than volunteers do not make employment decisions on the basis
of religion, although that figure is likely different with respect to
newer religiously integrated programs.193  Thus, while uncer-
tainty in the law regarding the ability of FBOs to hire coreligion-
ists in publicly funded programs may dissuade some pervasively
religious FBOs from participating, the facts are that both Chari-
table Choice statutes and state practices generally permit such
actions.
Again, the situation in Oregon fits the general practice.
Neither the Oregon Revised Statutes  nor the Oregon Administra-
tive Rules  impose any restrictions on employment practices spe-
cific to FBOs.194  As such, neither state law nor the personal
services contracts contain language prohibiting FBOs from hiring
only coreligionists to perform work under a state-funded con-
tract.  This last statement is qualified, however, by section
659A.030 of the Oregon Revised Statutes , Oregon’s general non-
discrimination statute.  Section 659A.030 prohibits discrimination
in employment on the basis of “race, religion, color, sex, national
origin, marital status or age.”  An employer is defined as any per-
son who “engages or uses the personal services of one or more
employees.”195  Section 659A.030 applies irrespective of the exis-
190 See  Green & Sherman, supra  note 156, at 40.
191 See supra  notes 5 and 160.
192 RAGAN ET AL., supra  note 116, at 15 (“In 23 states, or 57.5 percent of the
states for which information is currently available, FBOs may select employees on
the basis of religion.”).
193 See  Green & Sherman, supra  note 156, at 21 (indicating that less than one-
third of FBOs consider faith commitments when hiring staff).
194 In addition to requiring contractors to comply with Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, section V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), the State requires all contractors to comply with section
659A.142 of the Oregon Revised Statutes , Oregon’s disability nondiscrimination law.
195 See OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.001(4) (2003).
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tence of public funding.  Moreover, it does not exclude religious
organizations from the definition of “employer,” which suggests
that congregations and other FBOs must comply with the
prohibitions on religious discrimination, among others.  How-
ever, section 659A.006(2) of the Oregon Revised Statutes
provides:
[T]his section shall not be construed to prevent a bona fide
church or sectarian religious institution, including but not lim-
ited to a school, hospital or church camp, from preferring an
employee or applicant for employment of one religious sect or
persuasion over another when:
(a) That religious sect or persuasion to which the employee
or applicant belongs is the same as that of such church or
institution;
(b) In the opinion of such bona fide church or sectarian re-
ligious institution, such a preference will best serve the pur-
poses of such church or institution; and
(c) The employment involved is closely connected with or
related to the primary purposes of the church or institution
and is not connected with a commercial or business activity
which has no necessary relationship to the church or institu-
tion, or to its primary purposes.
As a result, a FBO would be exempt from complying with Ore-
gon’s prohibition on religious employment discrimination pro-
vided the employee is: (1) a member or adherent of the same
religion as the FBO; (2) the FBO believes (presumably in good
faith) that engaging in a religious preference “will best serve the
purposes” of the FBO; and (3) the employment position is
“closely connected with or related to the primary [religious] pur-
poses” of the FBO, which, broadly conceived, could include char-
itable work.  This last provision sets up a potential inconsistency,
however.  If the “primary purpose” of the FBO is to share its
faith, and the employment duties are closely connected with that
purpose, then those duties would not normally qualify for public
funding.  Because only secular programs of a FBO can be
funded, it is unclear whether secular employment functions
would qualify under section 659A.006(2)(c) as being closely con-
nected with or related to the primary purposes of the FBO.196
196 Additionally, under the language of section 659A.006(2), the exemption may
not apply to a FBO that is not a “church or sectarian religious institution,” such as
an interdenominational organization like Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon.  Even
then, the ability to favor an employee of one faith over others extends only to em-
ployees or applicants belonging to the same “religious sect or persuasion” as the
FBO.  Apparently, an interdenominational Christian organization (assuming it qual-
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In sum, Oregon’s experience in contracting with FBOs to pro-
vide social services tracks the national data.  Contrary to the Ad-
ministration’s rhetoric of discrimination, Oregon has a long
history of contracting and collaborating with FBOs, albeit with
the larger and more established players.  Consistent with studies
that both predate and postdate the Faith-Based Initiative, there
has been no evidence of government discrimination or bias
against religious entities, even against those FBOs that would be
classified as pervasively sectarian or prefer religiously integrated
approaches (although religiously integrated programs may not
satisfy a particular offering contained in a RFP).  As the national
studies confirm, the smaller FBOs and congregations in Oregon
that do not participate in government-funded programs do so out
of perceived concerns about state regulations, bureaucratic red
tape, and the complexity of the application process, not out of a
sense of government hostility toward religion.  While these fac-
tors may constitute “barriers” in the broadest sense, these re-
quirements are not imposed any differently on FBOs and are a
far cry from a “legacy of discrimination” against religion, as the
President has asserted.
D. Oregon Constitutional Constraints
The final “barrier” or basis for discrimination rests in the con-
stitutional prohibition against the funding of pervasively secta-
rian or religiously integrated organizations.197  This rule,
contested by conservative legal scholars, is the source of much
criticism by Charitable Choice proponents.198  The pervasively
sectarian standard has been under attack for more than a decade,
and its future before the Supreme Court is in serious doubt.199
As discussed in the Introduction, the closest decision on the sub-
ject remains Bowen v. Kendrick , where the Court upheld partici-
ifies for the exemption) could prefer Christians but not be more sect-specific in its
preferences, whereas a church could prefer members of its particular denomination
or sect.  These limitations under the exemption, which appear to favor more secta-
rian FBOs over their more ecumenical counterparts, may run afoul of holdings by
the Oregon Supreme Court prohibiting unequal treatment of religious organiza-
tions. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Rogue Valley Youth for
Christ, 307 Or. 490, 770 P.2d 588 (1989); Salem Coll. & Acad. v. Employment Div.,
298 Or. 471, 695 P.2d 25 (1985).
197 See  Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1988); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 743 (1973).
198 See supra  note 62.
199 See  Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 826-29 (2000).
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pation by FBOs in federal grant programs but at the same time
reaffirmed that some religious organizations and programs might
be “too religious” if religion is so intertwined in the services that
the secular and religious functions are inseparable.200  More re-
cently, however, the Court has appeared less concerned about
public funds flowing to religiously integrated institutions under
general benefits programs, provided there is no evidence the
funds are paying for religious indoctrination.201  And in 2000, a
plurality of the Court opined that the pervasively sectarian stan-
dard is “born of bigotry, [and] should be buried now.”202
The legitimacy of the pervasively sectarian standard need not
be addressed here,203 because the rule, as a bar to participation
by FBOs, has not been rigorously enforced by state entities or
served to prevent participation by faith-integrated organiza-
tions.204  As addressed above, this practice holds true in Oregon.
Practice and law do not always conform, however. Notwith-
standing Oregon’s permissive practices, its constitutional inter-
pretations may potentially serve as barriers to FBO participation
in government contracts and programs in two ways: (1) interpre-
tations of the state constitution’s prohibitions on funding relig-
ious institutions;205 and (2) the extent to which Oregon courts
200 “[W]e have always been careful to ensure that direct government aid to relig-
iously affiliated institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion.
One way in which direct government aid might have that effect is if the aid flows to
institutions that are ‘pervasively sectarian.’” Bowen , 487 U.S. at 609-10.
201 See  Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1997).
202 Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 829.
203 For a discussion, see Noah Feldman, Non-sectarianism Reconsidered , 18 J. L.
& POL. 65 (2002).
204 See MONSMA, supra  note 19, at 70-80. But cf . Freedom from Religion Founda-
tion v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002).  There, the Wisconsin De-
partment of Workforce Development entered into a contract with Faith Works to
fund a residential substance abuse treatment program that integrated spiritual prin-
ciples. Id. at 962-64.  The court held the direct financing of the program violated the
Establishment Clause because the public funds were supporting counselor salaries,
such that any religious indoctrination that occurred in the program was directly “at-
tributable to the state.” Id.  at 971.  Significantly, the court rejected Faith Works’
argument that because only twenty percent of the counselors’ time was spent on
spiritual counseling—and twenty percent of Faith Works’ income came from private
sources—the arrangement was constitutional. Id.  at 973-74.  Because Faith Works
commingled public and private funds and integrated spirituality throughout its coun-
seling program, the government was effectively paying for a religious program.
205 See OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for
the benefit of any religious or theological institution, nor shall any money be appro-
priated for the payment of any religious services in either house of the Legislative
Assembly.”).
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would recognize a free exercise claim or defense to the enforce-
ment of a state regulation.206
Generally speaking, the Oregon courts have interpreted the
religion clauses of the Oregon Constitution in ways consistent
with interpretations of the federal Religion Clauses.207  With re-
spect to Oregon’s nonestablishment provision, the Oregon courts
have generally applied the same analytical standards to article I,
section 5 as the U.S. Supreme Court has applied to the Establish-
ment Clause.208  This suggests that the Oregon courts would
likely follow decisions such as Bowen v. Kendrick  and hold that
section 5 does not bar FBOs from participating in state contracts
and grants, provided the State does not favor religious providers
and the funds are spent on secular services.  As the Oregon Su-
preme Court remarked in 1961: “Neither the federal nor the state
constitutions prohibit the state from conferring benefits upon re-
ligious institutions where that benefit does not accrue to the insti-
tution as a religious organization.  The proscription is against aid
to religious functions .”209  Apparently, the Oregon courts do not
view section 5 as imposing any stricter separation of church and
state than that provided under the federal First Amendment.210
As the Oregon Court of Appeals stated recently: “[T]he Oregon
Constitution does not embrace an unusually strict principle of
separation of church and state.  Rather, Oregon’s religion clauses
were intended to ensure that the state does not cross the line
between neutrality toward religion and support of religion.”211
Despite such statements, the Oregon courts have at times
demonstrated a willingness to depart from federal standards
when interpreting the Oregon Constitution.212  In Dickman v.
206 See OR. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“No law shall in any case whatever control the free
exercise, and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of
conscience.”).
207 See Portland v. Thornton, 174 Or. 508, 512, 149 P.2d 972 (1942).
208 See, e.g., Eugene Sand and Gravel v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 1020-23,
558 P.2d 338, 346-48 (1976); Powell v. Bunn, 185 Or. App. 334, 355-56, 59 P.3d 559,
575-76 (2002).
209 Dickman v. Sch. Dist. No. 62C, 232 Or. 238, 256, 366 P.2d 533, 542-43 (1961).
210 See Dickman,  232 Or. at 246, 366 P.2d at 537 (“Article I, § 5 . . . was designed
to keep separate the functions of state and church and to prevent the influence of
one upon the other.  In this respect our constitution follows the general pattern of
other state constitutions and may be regarded as expressing, in more specific terms,
the policy of the First Amendment . . . .”).
211 Powell , 185 Or. App. at 357, 59 P.3d at 576.
212 See Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist., 301 Or. 358, 371, 723 P.2d 298, 307 (1986)
(“This court in fact has interpreted the meaning of these guarantees independently,
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School District No. 62C , the Oregon Supreme Court interpreted
section 5 as prohibiting textbook aid to parochial schools, some-
thing that the U.S. Supreme Court later allowed.213  Even more
recently, “the Oregon Supreme Court has adopted an indepen-
dent approach to state constitutional analysis” and has expressed
a “willingness to reexamine its holdings in prior cases.”214  The
point is that the Oregon Supreme Court has not ruled on a fund-
ing issue in recent years, at least not since it has adopted its more
independent approach to interpreting the Oregon Constitution.
Under current—and likely future—interpretations of section 5,
however, state contracts with and grants to FBOs to provide sec-
ular social services would likely be allowed, provided the State
can assure that public funds are not being spent on religious ac-
tivities and it is not preferring or endorsing religious organiza-
tions or their programs.215
With respect to the indirect funding of a FBO through a certifi-
cate or voucher, it is less clear whether the Oregon Supreme
Court would follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris and interpret section 5 as permitting the use of
a state voucher in a religiously infused program.216  On the one
hand, the Dickman  court noted that section 5 should not  be in-
terpreted as preventing every conceivable benefit from accruing
to a religious institution.217  The court there distinguished be-
tween “direct and substantial” benefits and “financial aid [that]
flows indirectly and incidentally . . . through an expenditure for a
governmental purpose clearly within constitutional limits.”218
This last statement, though, begs the question of what types of
expenditures are “within constitutional limits.”  On the other
hand, the same court indicated a willingness to scrutinize the de-
gree of a benefit afforded to a religious organization, irrespective
of the funding mechanism, stating that “[w]e do not regard as
sometimes with results contrary to those reached by the United States Supreme
Court.”).
213 See Dickman , 232 Or. 238, 366 P.2d 533.  In so doing, the court rejected the
“child benefit” theory that the U.S. Supreme Court had embraced. See id. at 250,
366 P.2d at 539-40; see also Fisher v. Clackamas County Sch. Dist., 13 Or. App. 56,
507 P.2d 839 (1973) (striking program providing secular educational services in a
parochial school).
214 Powell , 185 Or. App. at 357, 59 P.3d at 576.
215 Cooper , 301 Or. at 373, 723 P.2d at 308.
216 See  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
217 232 Or. at 247-48, 366 P.2d at 538-39.
218 Id. at 247-48, 366 P.2d at 538-39.
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significant the fact that [the Oregon] constitution does not con-
tain the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ as some constitutions
do.”219  Once again, what appears to be key is whether the public
funds are aiding “religious functions .”220
Oregon courts have interpreted Oregon’s “free exercise
clause,” article I, section 3, in a like manner of consistency and
divergence.221  Generally, the Oregon Supreme Court has ap-
plied a standard similar to that applied by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Employment Division v. Smith222—a case that arose in
Oregon—where the Court held that free exercise interests are
not implicated by laws and regulations that apply equally to relig-
ious and nonreligious entities.  As the Oregon Supreme Court
described the standard in 1995:
A law that is neutral toward religion or nonreligion as such,
that is neutral among religions, and that is part of a general
regulatory scheme having no purpose to control or interfere
with rights of conscience or with religious opinions does not
violate the guarantees of religious freedom in Article I, sec-
tions 2 and 3.223
This means that the State could require contracting FBOs to
adhere to the same performance, employment, financial, report-
ing, and audit standards that it requires of nonreligious provid-
ers.  Because the funded services performed by the FBOs are to
be secular in the first instance, there would be no cognizable free
exercise infringement by requiring the FBOs to follow the same
neutral and generally applicable regulations.  This approach is
borne out in the following examples:
The Oregon courts have consistently held that requiring
churches and religious organizations to pay unemployment
compensation tax for their employees, including clergy, does
not infringe on free exercise interests.224  As the Supreme
219 Id. at 258 n.31, 366 P.2d at 534 n.31.
220 Id. at 256, 366 P.2d at 543.
221 See Employment Div. v. Rogue Valley Youth for Christ, 307 Or. 490, 498, 770
P.2d 588, 592 (1989) (“In a line of cases beginning with City of Portland v. Thornton ,
174 Or. 508, 512, 149 P.2d 972 (1944), this court has treated the First Amendment
Free Exercise clause as ‘identical in meaning’ with the Oregon constitutional provi-
sion covering the same subject.”).
222 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
223 Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor and Indus. , 322 Or. 132, 149, 903 P.2d 351, 361
(1995).
224 See Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 335 Or. 1, 56 P.3d 386
(2002); Rogue Valley Youth for Christ , 307 Or. 490, 770 P.2d 588; Salem Coll. and
Acad. v. Employment Div., 298 Or. 471, 695 P.2d 25 (1985).
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Court described the standard recently: “[W]e . . . conclude that
the unemployment compensation program is a valid and neu-
tral law of general applicability, from which the church and its
ministers are not exempt upon the ground that the church is a
religious organization.”225
The Oregon Supreme Court has held that section 659A.030,
Oregon’s nondiscrimination in employment law described above,
applies to religious employers:
A general scheme prohibiting religious discrimination in em-
ployment, including religious harassment, does not conflict
with any of the underpinnings of the Oregon constitutional
guarantees of religious freedom . . . :   It does not infringe on
the right of an employer independently to develop or to prac-
tice his or her own religious opinions or exercise his or her
rights of conscience, short of the employer’s imposing them on
employees holding other forms of belief or nonbelief; it does
not discourage the multiplicity of religious sects; and it applies
equally to all employers and thereby does not choose among
religions or beliefs.226
The Meltebeke  holding was particularly important in that it
identified the primary free exercise interest to be protected by
section 659A.030 as being that of the employee , not the religious
employer.227
Therefore, the Oregon courts are unlikely to hold that Ore-
gon’s religion clauses protect FBOs from following general per-
formance, employment, financial, reporting, or audit
requirements.  The State may generally require such adherence
without burdening the free exercise interests of the FBOs.228
225 Newport Church , 335 Or. at 13, 56 P.3d at 392-93.  The court held against the
church on both general free exercise and autonomy grounds:  “The church auton-
omy doctrine might insulate the church from the dictates of a secular court regarding
liturgy and leadership, but it does not permit a church, as a general matter, to cloak
its decisions and actions in secrecy when the law requires compliance with the re-
quirements of civil law.” Id. at 15, 56 P.3d at 394.
226 Meltebeke , 322 Or. at 148, 903 P.2d at 360.  As discussed above, however, a
religious organization may meet the limited exception contained in section
659A.006(2) of the Oregon Revised Statutes .
227 “The law prohibiting religious discrimination, including religious harassment,
honors the constitutional commitment to religious pluralism by ensuring that em-
ployees can earn a living regardless of their  religious beliefs.” Id.  at 148, 903 P.2d at
360.
228 Recently, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. City of West Linn , 338 Or.
453, 111 P.3d 1123 (2005), a case involving the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000), the Oregon Supreme Court took a nar-
row view of the imposition necessary to constitute a substantial burden on religious
practice.
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Such judicial interpretations could serve as barriers to FBOs by
dissuading them from applying to participate in state grants and
contracts.
A limited caveat to this rule would be those possible instances
where a neutral regulation interfered in matters of church tenets,
liturgy, or decisions regarding the training, selection, and reten-
tion of clergy.229  In such instances, the State may be required to
grant an exemption to the legal requirements.  The Meltebeke
decision also muddied the waters regarding the “neutrality” stan-
dard that the Oregon courts otherwise apply.  There, the court
appeared to provide slightly higher protection of religion in a
neutral regulation context by requiring the State to prove a
heightened mental awareness of harassment when it is done for a
religious reason:
When a person engages in a religious practice, the state may
not restrict that person’s activity unless it first demonstrates
that the person is consciously aware that the conduct has an
effect forbidden by the law that is being enforced . . . .  With
respect to an employer whose activity that violates BOLI’s
rule constitutes a religious practice, as in the case here, the
employer must know that that activity created an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.230
It is unclear whether this rule that the State must afford
greater latitude to religiously motivated actions that otherwise
violate neutral regulations applies outside the employment (or
harassment) context.  Some general language in Meltebeke  sug-
gests broader application.231  However, in the more recent hold-
ing of Newport Church , the court reverted to its narrower
description of the legal standard discussed above, without indi-
cating any potential discrepancy represented in Meltebeke .232
In conclusion, although the Oregon courts have not ruled on a
religious funding case recently, it is unlikely that they would
strike down a direct-funding program or contract involving FBOs
229 Newport Church , 335 Or. at 15, 56 P.3d at 394.
230 Meltebeke , 322 Or. at 152, 903 P.2d at 362.
231 Id. at 153, 903 P.2d at 363 (“Because sections 2 and 3 of Article I are expressly
designed to prevent government-created homogeneity of religion, the government
may not constitutionally impose sanctions on an employer for engaging in religious
practice without knowledge that the practice has a harmful effect on the employees
intended to be protected.  If the rule were otherwise, fear of unwarranted govern-
ment punishment would stifle or make insecure the employer’s enjoyment and exer-
cise of religion, seriously eroding the very values that the constitution expressly
exempts from government control.”).
232 Newport Church , 335 Or. at 13, 56 P.3d at 392-93.
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where the State could demonstrate the public funds were not
used for religious activity.  How the courts would approach a
challenge to the funding of a religiously integrated program or
organization is unclear, although it is more likely that such a pro-
gram would be upheld where it could be demonstrated the public
funds did not pay for “religious functions.”  Interpretations of
the Oregon Constitution’s free exercise clause, article I, section
3, indicate that FBOs would likely be subject to neutral state reg-
ulations, even though such regulations might arguably burden a
FBO’s free exercise interests.  While such constitutional interpre-
tations may serve as barriers to FBOs by dissuading their partici-
pation in state grants and contracts, they do not evince a “legacy
of discrimination” against religious organizations.
III
THE CASE FOR COLLABORATION
This Article has argued that the primary justification for the
Faith-Based Initiative—to end discrimination against religious
organizations—is not supported by the facts.  Studies of religious
participation in government social service programs that both
preceded and followed the issuance of Unlevel Playing Field indi-
cated a lack of bias, discrimination, or purposeful exclusion of
FBOs, at both the federal and state levels.  The 2003 Roundtable
Study and the Oregon Law Commission Report both substanti-
ate these earlier studies.  While most data confirms that small
FBOs and congregations—many of which follow a religiously in-
tegrated approach to services—do not participate at the same
levels as their larger, more secular counterparts, these disparities
are usually explained by factors other than government discrimi-
nation or bias (e.g., unfamiliarity with the grant process, fear of
government regulations).233  Much of the failure of small FBOs
and congregations to participate is attributable to self-selection
based on weakly supported or unsubstantiated fears rather than
on affirmative actions by the government.  Finally, while there is
some evidence that participation by small FBOs and congrega-
tions has increased since the advent of Charitable Choice, studies
indicate that conservative/evangelical congregations are less
likely in the long term to collaborate with the government than
mainstream and ecumenical congregations, and that the types of
233 MONSMA & MOUNTS, supra  note 77, at 15-16.
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services provided by congregations will likely be limited to those
areas that involve less investment and infrastructure.  For the
foreseeable future, the established religiously affiliated agencies
will continue to provide the bulk of FBO charitable services.234
All of this information was available to the White House
OFBCI before it embarked on its rhetoric of discrimination.  As
the Bush Administration knew, or should have known, the expla-
nations for past disparities in participation by FBOs—those dis-
parities being significantly more modest than the Administration
has alleged—rest on a host of causes.  Rather than acknowledg-
ing the complexity of the issue, the Administration chose to over-
simplify and mischaracterize it.  By aggressively pushing the
discrimination argument, the Administration unnecessarily
politicized matters while it alienated many in the mainstream re-
ligious and civil rights communities who might otherwise support
increased collaboration between FBOs and the government.235
That said, the failings of the Faith-Based Initiative should not
condemn faith-based and government collaborations, funded or
otherwise.  The history of cooperation, as evidenced in Oregon
and most other states, is too long and important to abandon.  The
government should be able to encourage and initiate partnering
with religious organizations and, in some instances, acknowledge
the unique contributions that FBOs may provide in addressing
human suffering.  Provided sufficient safeguards are in place to
ensure public accountability—including that public funds are not
paying for religiously infused services—and that beneficiary
rights are protected, religious organizations should be able to
participate in many government-funded social service programs.
To exclude their participation is often unnecessary (in a constitu-
tional sense) and undesirable as a policy matter.
Generally speaking, congregations and religious organizations
contribute to the common good and are a positive influence in
our democratic society.  Because of their commitment to com-
passion and alleviating human suffering, religious organizations
may be particularly adept at providing important social ser-
vices.236  Religious organizations, such as the Salvation Army and
234 See  Chaves, Religious Congregations, supra note 158, at 836-46.
235 See  David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A
Problem Best Avoided , 116 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1361-64 (2003).
236 WHO WILL PROVIDE? THE CHANGING ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN
WELFARE, supra  note 141, at 12-13.
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Catholic Charities, have long been at the forefront of ministering
to those in need and possess the expertise and experience to be
effective service providers.237  Religious organizations and con-
gregations also have frequently been the leading advocates for
political, economic, and civil equality and justice, spearheading
the abolition, civil rights, and peace movements.  And many re-
ligious organizations and congregations are located in inner cities
and rural areas where the need is greatest, thus having already
established relationships—and trust—with people in need.238
The value of religious inclusion rests on more than the prag-
matic, however.  Religious organizations, and potentially nonreli-
gious civic associations, often serve an important mediating role
between people and their civil institutions.239  Religion is an im-
portant source of normative values that contribute to the demo-
cratic commonweal.  The Framers, while establishing a secular
form of government, recognized the important role that religion
plays in American culture, particularly as a source of civic virtue,
compassion, and moral example.240  Religion can express these
values in ways that the government often cannot, and should not,
express them.  For many people, religious institutions may be a
greater source of important civic values and may be more legiti-
mate than government institutions.241  But these values are no
less legitimate or important for the common good merely be-
cause they are expressed most frequently by religious organiza-
tions.  This being the case, the government should be able to
acknowledge the “unique” attributes of religion (and of similar
nonreligious private institutions) and initiate collaborations
where they achieve mutual goals.  This does not mean that gov-
ernment should turn a blind eye to collaborative consequences
that result in government advancement or endorsement of relig-
ious doctrine or the coercion of belief.  But conversely, the gov-
ernment should not be disabled from recognizing the unique
qualifications of religion and its contributions to the
commonwealth.
237 See  Skocpol, supra  note 141, at 21-50.
238 Several of these points are addressed in more detail in David Cole, Faith and
Funding: Toward an Resressivist Model of the Establishment Clause , 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 559, 566-73 (2002).
239 See GLENN, supra  note 26, at 3-8; Cole, supra  note 238, at 573.
240 See  John Adams, Thoughts on Government , in  1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, 401, 401-09 (Charles S. Hyneman &
Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
241 Cole, supra  note 238, at 566-73.
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Returning to the Oregon experience, a possible example of
this collaborative approach may be section 409.180 of the Oregon
Revised Statutes , which authorizes DHS case workers to contact
a beneficiary’s religious congregation or other intermediary or-
ganization in an effort to coordinate services.  This new law re-
quires state workers to inform beneficiaries of this option, which
necessitates inquiry into a person’s religious affiliation, if any.
While this policy raises concerns about confidentiality and the
State placing subtle pressure on beneficiaries to establish or
maintain relationships with congregations, those issues can be
addressed through training and guidelines.  What the law allows
is for the State to acknowledge a potential community as a re-
source and collaborate with it in serving a beneficiary’s needs.
This is not to argue that religious social service organizations
are preferable to their secular counterparts or are more effective
in their programs.  The battle over effectiveness of services rages,
and it is unlikely that a definitive answer will ever emerge, prima-
rily because different people are receptive to different ap-
proaches.242  Rather, this Article argues that, based on
characteristics that are common to many FBOs (though not nec-
essarily exclusive to religion), religious organizations may offer
some uniquely beneficial approaches to addressing human need.
The Framers thought that religious organizations performed dis-
tinct functions in our society and wrote the Constitution in a
manner that called for distinctive treatment.  The Framers also
believed that religion promoted values important to the Repub-
lic.243  In a like manner, contemporary government should be
able to recognize the unique or distinct attributes of religious or-
ganizations and seek to access those qualities in certain circum-
stances.  While permitting such recognition is pregnant with risks,
it also promises rewards that may be too valuable to ignore.
This call for inclusion has its limits, both constitutionally and
practicably.  One of the chief failings of Charitable Choice—
242 Compare  Stephen V. Monsma, Are Faith-Based Programs More Effective? ,
PUB. JUST. REP. (2001), http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyReader$545, with CTR.
FOR URBAN POLICY AND ENV’T, IND. UNIV.-PURDUE UNIV. INDIANAPOLIS, FAITH-
BASED SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISIONI UNDER CHARITABLE CHOICE: A STUDY OF IM-
PLEMENTATION IN THREE STATES, http://ccr.urbancenter.iupui.edu/ pro-
ject_descrip.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2005); Alan Cooperman, Faith-Based Charities
May Not be Better, Study Indicates , WASH. POST, May 25, 2003, at A7.
243 Those values would be instilled in individuals, however, through a voluntary
and consensual system of membership and affiliation without interference by the
government.
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aside from the constitutional concerns244—is that it has been sub-
sumed in arguments for privatization and devolution of govern-
ment responsibility toward the needy.  Charitable Choice and its
“armies of compassion” are not the solution to the dilemma of
poverty and need.  First, FBOs alone can never address the bulk
of human suffering.  Even with increased funding, many FBOs
lack the organization, structure, and sophistication to do more
than supplement government programs.245  Second, privatization,
with its emphasis on market competition and consumer participa-
tion, may well lead to the abdication of government responsibil-
ity for the needy.246  Third, even though FBOs promote
important normative values, those values can never supplant
other important democratic principles that the government must
guarantee, such as equality and fairness.  As Martha Minow has
argued, privatization of social services may “undermine public
commitments both to ensure fair and equal treatment and to pre-
vent discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, or sex-
ual orientation.”247  For all of these values to be respected,
Charitable Choice must remain truly collaborative with the gov-
ernment—and not a substitute for government responsibility—
with FBOs understanding the necessary costs that must accom-
pany any such partnership.  Namely, that government funded
programs must remain politically accountable.
Assuming that balance can be found, church-state separation-
ists, who are predominately politically and socially liberal, should
cautiously embrace religious involvement in social service pro-
grams, although they should not yield on their demands for con-
stitutional safeguards under Charitable Choice.  The vast
majority of religious organizations that provide human services
244 The constitutional issues are addressed in Green, supra  note 13, at 33-48.
245 Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End
of Welfare as We Knew It , 49 DUKE L.J. 493, 496 (1999); Thiemann et al., supra  note
141, at 56-58.
246 See  Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion , 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2003) (“The new versions of privatization
potentially jeopardize public purposes by pressing for market-style competition, by
sidestepping norms that apply to public programs, and by eradicating the public
identity of social efforts to meet human needs.”); see also  Cole, supra  note 238, at
576-77; Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public
and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious , 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061,
1082 (2000).
247 Minow, Public and Private Partnerships, supra  note 246, at 1230; see also  Ste-
phen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Or-
ganizations, and Liberal Public Values , 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417 (2000).
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to their greater communities do so out of a commitment to values
that political liberals often share and should embrace.248  Separa-
tionists must learn to cautiously welcome the larger message of
collaboration, while rejecting the rhetoric of discrimination and
division.
CONCLUSION
Charitable Choice has made two positive contributions to the
commonweal.  First, it has heightened awareness of the role that
religious organizations have long played in providing important
services to people in need.  Much of that need would be unmet if
religious organizations and the government did not participate as
partners in providing important social services.  If that awareness
has encouraged state officials to be more receptive to collaborat-
ing with FBOs, and to refine some requirements and procedures
to facilitate collaboration, then it has been a positive contribu-
tion.  Second, Charitable Choice has likely increased participa-
tion in government grants and programs by some FBOs that
previously felt unwelcome or were suspicious about collaborating
with the government.  While many of those fears were un-
founded, they still served as a self-imposed barrier to participa-
tion.  To the extent that religious organizations can exercise their
values of compassion, nurture, and respect, society will be made
a better place.
Yet, while Charitable Choice may have made a positive contri-
bution to the debate over how to best provide services to people
in need, it has been advanced for many wrong reasons, the least
of which being partisan political gain.  The rhetoric of discrimina-
tion has been unfounded, unfortunate, and divisive.  Moreover,
the extent to which the failings of Charitable Choice remain—the
marginalization of establishment clause and employment dis-
crimination concerns, the loss of public accountability, and the
abdication of government responsibility for the poor—may un-
dermine the possible gains promised by greater collaboration be-
tween religious organizations and the State.
248 Cole, supra  note 238, at 562.
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